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The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice
Rehnquist and Federalism
Jeff Powellt
The Supreme Court under Chief Justice Warren Burger is widely per-
ceived to be "drifting . . . a choir of most uncertain trumpets."' It seems
to lack both the powerful organizing principles and the commanding judi-
cial personalities of the Warren Court. More and more frequently, the
Burger Court has found itself badly split; individual cases often lead to a
bewildering melange of separate opinions, partial dissents, and concur-
rences in the result. The Court's recurrent flipflops on doctrinal issues,2
and the not uncommon refusal of the Justices to accept as final a holding
with which they disagree,3 point to wildly conflicting concepts of what
they, and the Constitution, are about. The insistence of the individual
Justices on presenting and adhering to their particular viewpoints suggests
that they view judicial opinions not as attempts to fashion "decisions ac-
cording to law"" but rather as "opinions" in the everyday sense of that
word.
This phenomenon-intense intellectual individualism destroying even
the possibility of compromise or consensus-has not been confined to the
Supreme Court. In Congress and elsewhere we see pro-choice and right-
to-life lobbyists, proponents of affirmative action and opponents of busing,
civil libertarians and the Moral Majority, and assorted other opposing
groups squaring off for prolonged shouting matches in which both sides
begin and end convinced of their own rectitude and of the other group's
blindness, if not perversity.' In legal circles this phenomenon frequently
produces a sort of cynicism regarding constitutional law and quasi-consti-
tutional statutes such as Title VII or the Sherman Act. People deeply and
sincerely committed to their own positions in these areas nevertheless con-
cede that their opinions are, at least in the sphere of legal discourse,
t J.D., Yale Law School, 1982. I wish to thank Professor Owen Fiss of Yale Law School for his
advice and encouragement.
1. Kilpatrick, Why Justice O'Connor? 69 NATION'S BUS., October, 1981, at 20.
2. Compare Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (alienage declared suspect classifi-
cation for equal protection purposes) with Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 102 S. Ct. 735, 738-40 (1982)
(narrowing scope of Graham).
3. Note, for example, the refusal of Justices Brennan and Marshall to accept the majority's death
penalty holding in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). See, e.g., Rook v. North Carolina, 102 S.
Ct. 1741 (1982) (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting from denial of cert.).
4. See C. BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW (1981).
5. See A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 6-10 (1981).
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merely statements of policy preferences rather than legal arguments that
seek to persuade others and are themselves open to criticism and correc-
tion on the basis of common principles. This attitude toward constitutional
law reverses the old maxim that the American government is one of laws
rather than of men; in effect it denies that the Constitution is law at all.
In addition, by converting questions of constitutional law into purely par-
tisan political disputes, it inverts de Tocqueville's remark that in America
all questions of policy end up as questions of law.
This sea change in our legal culture indicates the dominance in consti-
tutional discourse of emotivism-"[T]he doctrine that all evaluative judg-
ments . . . are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of atti-
tude or feeling."6 From an emotivist standpoint evaluative judgments
differ radically from factual judgments. The latter are true or false and
can be evaluated by "rational criteria by means of which we may secure
agreement as to what is true and what is false."7 Evaluative judgments, on
the other hand, cannot be more than mere "expressions of preference." As
a result, disagreement over an evaluative judgment can never be resolved
by rational criteria. In the sphere of constitutional law, emotivism implies
that there are no "neutral principles"' or universally accepted presupposi-
tions that would enable us to conduct constitutional disputes as rational
arguments. Even though the parties to such disputes may regard their
positions as more than mere "expressions of attitude or feeling" in the
context of their personal ethical or religious beliefs, both they and the
judges who resolve the disputes are likely to perceive the arguments on
both sides as "nothing but expressions of preference" in" the sphere of
legal discourse. The individualism currently gripping the Supeme Court is
a strong indication that the Justices are operating within a framework of
constitutional emotivism.9
In such a "period of significant disarray in constitutional doctrine...
[and] apparent disarray in the Court,""0 the subjects of this Arti-
cle-federalism and Justice William Rehnquist-seem at first glance the
most likely instruments for the refurbishing of doctrine and Court. Rehn-
quist frequently receives high marks from observers as one of the Court's
most powerful intellects," and his authorship of many of the most impor-
6. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
7. Id. at 11-12.
8. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
9. See A. MACINTYRE, supra note 5, at 235-36.
10. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (Supp. 1979).
11. Rehnquist has been called "the philosopher of this Court." Frank, The Burger Court-The
First Ten Years, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101, 125 (Summer 1980). See also Shapiro, Mr.
Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293 (1976). Professor Shapiro's article,
which discusses both the substance and the craftsmanship of Rehnquist's first five years as a Justice, is
the starting point for any examination of Rehnquist the jurist. Shapiro's careful examination of Rehn-
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tant recent decisions of the Court 2 testifies to his increasing influence on
his colleagues. Furthermore, he has shown great concern over precisely
the problem that is bedevilling the Court.
In a law review article published in 1976, Justice Rehnquist identified
what is described here as emotivism in constitutional law as a pervasive
threat to American legal and democratic values." Rehnquist used the term
"the living Constitution" for an idea he found common in current consti-
tutional discourse: that judges are free, in the name of the Constitution, to
impose on the other branches of government "some other set of values
[than] those which may be derived from the language and intent of the
framers" of the Constitution."' This idea assumes, Rehnquist wrote, that
"there is [no] ascertainable content to the general phrases of the Constitu-
tion as they are written."'" Once this is accepted, he argued, constitutional
argument becomes an exercise in pure emotivism:
Beyond the Constitution and the laws in our society, there simply is
no basis other than the individual conscience of the citizen that may
serve as a platform for the launching of moral judgments. There is
no conceivable way in which I can logically demonstrate to you that
the judgments of my conscience are superior to the judgments of your
conscience, and vice versa. Many of us necessarily feel strongly and
deeply about our own moral judgments, but they remain only per-
sonal moral judgments until in some way given the sanction of law.16
Justice Rehnquist's response to the reduction of constitutional discus-
sion to a civil war of consciences is to reject the initial emotivist premise,
and to argue that one can derive a determinate "set of values . .. from
the language and intent of the framers" "by detached and objective" inter-
pretation.' 7 The intent of the Framers can then serve as an objective stan-
quist's opinions led him to recognize in them "a kind of 'natural law' of states' rights." Id. at 302.
Yet, since the full development of Rehnquist's federalism occurred after Shapiro's article was written,
Shapiro failed to recognize federalism's role as the organizing principle in Rehnquist's work. Thus, he
regarded National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), as a departure from the principles
Rehnquist claimed to be following rather than as the prototypical explication of the Justice's constitu-
tional philosophy. See Shapiro, supra, at 306-07. Shapiro found three principles shaping Rehnquist's
work: whenever possible, (1) conflicts between an individual and a government should be decided
against the individual, (2) conflicts between states and the federal government should be decided
against the federal government, and (3) federal jurisdiction should not be exercised. Id. at 294. As
rough generalizations about the results of Rehnquist's jurisprudence, these principles are accurate.
This Article argues, however, that Rehnquist's constitutional theory is more complex and less oriented
toward particular political goals than Shapiro recognized.
12. E.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S. Ct. 2972 (1981) (Iranian assets case); Rostker v.
Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981) (draft registration case).
13. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 706 (1976).
14. Id. at 695.
15. Id. at 698.
16. Id. at 704.
17. Id. at 695.
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dard by which to measure constitutional arguments. Without such a stan-
dard, argues Rehnquist, judges will continue to function as "free-
wheeling" agents promoting their own notions of good policy rather than
as "keepers of the covenant" 8 originally entered into with the ratification
of the Constitution.1 9
Drawing on an ancient theme in American political life closely associ-
ated with Thomas Jefferson, Rehnquist has argued that the constitutional
first principle intended by the Framers was the maintenance of the federal
system and of the dignity and autonomy of the states. In his view, solici-
tude for the values of federalism must therefore remain a primary goal of
judicial decision-making.
This Article attempts to outline the theory of federalism that emerges
from Justice Rehnquist's work on the Court. It first examines Rehnquist's
articulation of the theory's basic themes in a series of decisions that center
around his opinion for the Court in National League of Cities v. Usery 0
The Article then discusses Rehnquist's efforts to flesh out his theory of
federalism in three significant areas: the relationship of federal power to
the states' legislative authority, the relationship of the federal courts to the
states' judicial and executive processes, and the restriction of Congress to
its enumerated powers narrowly defined as the essential pre-condition for
the states' autonomy. Finally, the Article argues that although Justice
Rehnquist's work is consistent with the Jeffersonian theory of federalism,
Rehnquist's attempt to transform this federalism into an objective consti-
tutional first principle must fail because it cannot be established that the
Framers intended to embody the theory in the Constitution.
I. The Theory of Federalism
The history of the United States is in large part the story of the Ameri-
can struggle to define the relationship between the states and the federal
government. The Union under the Articles of Confederation was a loose
alliance of quite separate states, in which "each State retain[ed] its sover-
eignty, freedom, and independence. 2 ' The present Constitution was con-
ceived and adopted as a result of the universal realization that under the
Articles "the government of the United States is destitute of energy,"" and
"not adequate to the purpose of the Union." 3 The resulting document
18. Id. at 698, 699.
19. Id. at 696.
20. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
21. ART. CONFED., art. II.
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 70 (Bantam Books ed. 1982) (A. Hamilton). Hamilton was one
of the leading proponents of a strong national government.
23. Remarks of Thomas Tredwell, prominent opponent of the 1787 Constitution, quoted in G.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 471 (1969).
1320
Vol. 91: 1317, 1982
Compleat Jeffersonian
vested the federal government with greatly expanded powers and corre-
spondingly constricted the autonomy of the states.
But the erection of this new constitutional structure did not end the
struggle over the meaning of federalism. The vigorous nationalism of the
Marshall Court provoked fear and suspicion among defenders of the states
such as Thomas Jefferson. 2' Andrew Jackson's firm assertion of national
authority was countered by the nullification and concurrent majority theo-
ries of John C. Calhoun.25 Antislavery lawyers championed states rights
against the invocation of federal law by slaveholders seeking fugitive
slaves.26 In 1861, the seceding Southern states devised a federal union in
which the balance of power would tilt permanently in favor of the states.21
But, just as the Civil War discredited the Confederacy's political exper-
iment, the Reconstruction era's constitutional and statutory lawmaking re-
pudiated the Confederacy's theory of federalism by greatly expanding the
federal government's power to invade areas traditionally reserved to the
states.2 Although Southern conservatives eventually succeeded in effec-
tively nullifying federal guarantees of civil and political rights primarily
intended to protect blacks,2 '9 their final success took place in a period
marked by increased federal judicial protection of property against state
efforts to regulate capitalism."0 The due process rationale for this federal
protection of economic conservativism was gradually extended to guaran-
teeing individual liberties such as freedom of speech against state interfer-
ence." Despite the Supreme Court's acceptance of economic liberalism in
the New Deal era, the expansion of federal power continued, finally re-
24. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Justice William Johnson (1823), reprinted in THE Po.
LITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 146-49 (E. Dumbauld ed. 1955).
25. See R. REMINI, THE REvOLUTIONARY AGE OF ANDREW JACKSON 82-100 (1976).
26. See Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111-12 (1977).
27. See CONFEDERATE STATES CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (state legislature can impeach Confederate
judges or officers resident and acting within the state). See also C.S. LEE, THE CONFEDERATE CONSTI-
TUTIONS 150 (1963) (Confederate Constitution was ultimate constitutional expression of states' rights
philosophy and state sovereignty concept in nineteenth-century America).
28. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (1865) (federal prohibition of slavery); amend. XIV (1868)
(federal definition of state citizenship; federal guarantees against states of privileges and immunities of
United States citizens, of due process, and of equal protection); amend. XV (1870) (federal prohibi-
tion of racial restrictions on voting). All three "Civil War Amendments" empowered Congress to
enforce their provisions "by appropriate legislation." See also Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27
(federal definition of United States citizenship; federal protection of basic civil rights); Force Act of
1871, 17 Stat. 13 (creating federal remedies for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law).
29. See W. GILLETTE, RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION 1869-1879 (1979).
30. The final triumph of the Southern conservatives was the disfranchisement of blacks between
1890 and 1910. See C.V. WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH 321-49 (1971). In the same
period, the federal courts began scrutinizing and invalidating state economic regulations under the
authority of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. The landmark decisions were Allgeyer
v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
31. This process began with Giflow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Although the Gitlow
Court upheld a conviction under a state criminal anarchy statute it explicitly assumed that freedom of
speech and press are protected against state impairment by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 66.
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turning to the field of race relations from which it had begun, with oppo-
nents of the Supreme Court's school desegregation decisions invoking state
sovereignty as a counter to the Court's assertion of federal authority.12
After the Supreme Court's timely repudiation of substantive due pro-
cess, the struggle over the federal/state balance of power seemed largely
resolved in favor of virtually plenary federal power. "[T]he conventional
wisdom was that, since 1937, there have been no judicially enforceable
limits on congressional power which derive from considerations of federal-
ism. The sole protections for the states, it was said, were political."" The
Reagan Administration's recent proposals to "return" power to the states
have dramatically demonstrated the potency of these political protections
for state sovereignty. But even before the Executive Branch endorsed a
refurbished federalism, the Supreme Court had opened the judicial door to
a new era of "states' rights." In 1976, Rehnquist's opinion for the Court
in National League of Cities v. Usery,34 discredited the conventional wis-
dom and reintroduced state sovereignty as a functioning legal limitation
on the federal legislative power. Although Usery engendered a storm of
academic comment," it has not as yet been followed in other Supreme
Court decisions.36 But while the case may be an aberration in the juris-
prudence of the Court, it is central to Justice Rehnquist's view of consti-
tutional law.
A. The Emergence of the Theory
Justice Rehnquist's understanding of state sovereignty first emerged
with clarity the term before Usery, in Fry v. United States." Fry involved
the application of the 1970 Economic Stabilization Act to state employees.
32. See C.V. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 156-57 (2d rev. ed. 1966).
33. L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 300 (1978). See also Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Feder-
alism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
34. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
35. E.g., Michaelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of 'Sovereignty' in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1103 (1977); Monaghan, The Burger Court and "Our
Federalism," 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39 (1980); Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities:
The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARv. L. REv.
1065 (1977); Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1191 (1977).
36. The Supreme Court has rejected Usery-like arguments in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
& Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981), and Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring in judgment) (federal statute regulating surface coal mining does not violate state sover-
eignty by displacing state regulation). See also Transportation Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 102 S.
Ct. 1349 (1982) (operation of railroad is not a traditional state function protected by state sovereignty
from federal regulation), and F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 102 S. Ct. 2126 (1982) (provisions of federal
statute affecting state utility regulation not violative of state sovereignty). The Court has accepted for
review a lower court ruling upholding a state challenge based on Usery to the application of the
federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 to state game wardens. See EEOC v. Wyo-
ming, 514 F. Supp. 595 (D. Wyo. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 996 (1982).
37. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
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The Pay Board established under the Act disallowed part of a pay in-
crease voted by the Ohio legislature; the Ohio Supreme Court nonetheless
ordered the full increase paid. The United States then sought an injunc-
tion to implement the Pay Board's ruling, which was granted by the Tem-
porary Emergency Court of Appeals. The United States Supreme Court
affirmed. Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court acknowledged that the
Tenth Amendment "expressly declares the constitutional policy that Con-
gress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integ-
rity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system," but stated
that "we are convinced that the wage restriction regulations constituted no
such drastic invasion of state sovereignty."3 The Court found Maryland
v. Wirtz, 9 which upheld the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act
to state-run hospitals and schools, to be a controlling precedent, and there-
fore upheld the Economic Stabilization Act as applied as a valid exercise
of the congressional commerce power.
Justice Marshall's opinion was remarkable not for its pro-federal hold-
ing but for its apparent willingness to consider Ohio's Tenth Amendment
argument. Earlier decisions had given much shorter shrift to invocations
of state sovereignty.40 The majority's soft-spoken defense of federal au-
thority nonetheless provoked one dissent on the merits-Justice
Rehnquist's 4
Rehnquist rejected the Court's holding as contrary to "a concept of con-
stitutional federalism which should .. .limit federal power under the
Commerce Clause. '4 2 Conceding that the Economic Stabilization Act was
within the scope of the commerce clause, even as applied, Justice Rehn-
quist differentiated between "asserting an absence of congressional legisla-
tive authority" and "asserting an affirmative constitutional right."'43 He
analogized Ohio's claim to an individual's invocation of a right guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights, and distinguished an attack on a federal statute as
exceeding the commerce clause's grant of power from an attack grounded
on a claim that a constitutionally protected liberty is being infringed.44 It
38. Id. at 547 n.7.
39. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
40. E.g., California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957) (National Railroad Adjustment Board validly
exercised jurisdiction over collective bargaining agreement between state-owned railroad and its em-
ployees); Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946) (Emergency Price Control Act validly applied to state
sales of timber); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938) (Congress can validly tax state Port
Authority employees, state sovereignty notwithstanding); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175,
185 (1936) ("The state can no more deny the power if its exercise has been authorized by Congress
than can an individual.")
41. Justice Douglas found that the issue was moot due to the Act's expiration. 421 U.S. at 549
(Douglas, J., separate opinion).
42. Id. at 554 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 553.
44. Id. at 552-53.
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is "well established," Rehnquist argued, "[t]hat the latter claim is of
greater force, and may succeed when the former will fail. . .. "'I
The "affirmative constitutional right" that the State of Ohio was assert-
ing in Fry was, according to Justice Rehnquist, a right "as a State" to be
free of economic regulation by Congress under its commerce power.46
Rehnquist distinguished the cases upholding Congress' power to tax state
employees' salaries47 with the observation that the federal income tax stat-
ute "is addressed to the employee alone . . . .Under the regulations
which the Court upholds today, the State of Ohio is itself told that it may
not pay more than specified amounts to its various employees." 48 Despite
the "rough similarites in practical effect" of the two laws-in both cases
the employees' net pay is reduced below the gross amount set by the
state-"the fact that the command of Congress operates directly upon the
State in the latter situation is of significance in a system of constitutional
federalism such as ours.149
Justice Rehnquist's opinion explicitly notes that the "state's right" he
finds limiting Congress' power in Fry has, like state immunity from fed-
eral taxation, "no explicit constitutional source."5 0 It is not the Tenth
Amendment that invalidates the Economic Stabilization Act, but rather a
"right, inherent in [Ohio's] capacity as a State.""1 In Rehnquist's view,
the Tenth Amendment is simply an example
of the understanding of those who drafted and ratified the Constitu-
tion that the States were sovereign in many respects, and that al-
though their legislative authority could be superseded by Congress in
many areas where Congress was competent to act, Congress was
nonetheless not free to deal with a State as if it were just another
individual or business enterprise subject to regulation. 2
Justice Rehnquist admitted that the federalism principle he discerns in
the Constitution does not rule out all congressional activity upon the
states. When a state engages in activity quite unlike its traditional activi-
ties, Congress can, in his view, regulate the state directly."' Furthermore,
45. Id. at 553.
46. Id. at 552 (emphasis in original).
47. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946); Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe,
306 U.S. 466 (1939); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
48. 421 U.S. at 554-55 n.1.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 554.
51. Id. at 553.
52. Id. at 557.
53. Using this traditional-nontraditional state activities test, Justice Rehnquist distinguished
United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) (upholding application of Federal Safety Appliance
Act to state). See 421 U.S. at 558 n.2. He indicated, however, that he thought Maryland v. Wirtz,
392 U.S. 183 (1968), the precedential basis for the majority's holding, was wrongly decided. See 421
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he left open the possibility that state sovereignty does not limit Congress'
war power, or its enforcement power under the Civil War Amendments,
in the same fashion that state sovereignty limits the commerce power."
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Fry thus outlined the basic contours of
his theory of federalism: its origin not in the text of the Constitution but
in "the intention of the Framers"" and its articulation as a doctrine of
state sovereignty limiting congressional exercise of the commerce power.
The opinion left unclear, however, both how the Framers' intent is to be
discerned, and how far the states' "inherent" right to be free of direct
congressional regulation extends. It was not until the next term, in Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery,6 that Justice Rehnquist had an opportu-
nity to begin to answer these questions.
B. National League of Cities v. Usery: The Theory's Centerpiece
In Usery, the Court was confronted with a situation similar to that in
Fry. A 1974 amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act extended the
Act's minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to virtually all state
and local government employees. Twenty states, the National League of
Cities, the National Governors' Conference, and several local governments
challenged the extension as an infringement of a constitutional right "run-
ning in favor of the States as States. '5 7 A three judge district court dis-
missed the complaint on the basis of Maryland v. Wirtz. But despite the
similarity of the petitioners' claim in Usery to the unsuccessful argument
in Fry, on this occasion four other Justices accepted what was essentially
the reasoning of Rehnquist's Fry dissent.
Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist paid cursory respect to the
"plenary authority" the commerce clause grants to Congress. 8 He stated
that "[t]his Court has never doubted that there are limits upon the power
of Congress to override state sovereignty, even when exercising its other-
wise plenary powers to tax or to regulate commerce, 5 9 an assertion that
amazed the dissenters.60 Rehnquist then reiterated his Fry distinction be-
tween asserting a lack of legislative authority for the Act and invoking an
affirmative constitutional right contradictory to the Act. In doing so, he
found a constitutionally significant difference between congressional regu-
lation of individuals, which may have an ancillary impact on the states,
U.S. at 558-59.
54. 421 U.S. at 558-59.
55. Id. at 559.
56. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
57. Id. at 837 (emphasis in original).
58. Id. at 840.
59. Id. at 842.
60. Id. at 857 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 880 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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and the "exercise of congressional authority directed . . . to the States as
States."'" He then announced that the critical factor in determining
whether a commerce clause regulation transgresses state sovereignty is
whether the affected state functions are "essential to separate and inde-
pendent existence.
' 6 2
Although the procedural posture of the case required the Court to take
the appellants' allegations of severe interference with their governmental
functions as true,63 Justice Rehnquist explicitly declined to base his con-
clusion on the specific impact of the Act on the states.6 He discussed the
possible effects of the 1974 amendment at some length, but in the end the
question for Justice Rehnquist was not one of practical results but of con-
stitutional principles.
[E]ven if we accept appellee's assessments concerning the impact of
the amendments, their application will nonetheless significantly alter
or displace the States' abilities to structure employer-employee rela-
tionships in such areas as fire prevention, police protection, sanita-
tion, public health, and parks and recreation. . . . it is functions
such as these which governments are created to provide, services such
as these which the States have traditionally afforded their citizens. If
Congress may withdraw from the States the authority to make those
fundamental employment decisions upon which their systems for
performance of these functions must rest, we think there would be
little left of the States' "'separate and independent existence.' ,,65
The appellee Secretary of Labor's most potent contention was that Fry
v. United States, and the decision on which it was based, Maryland v.
Wirtz, precluded a decision for the appellants. But Justice Rehnquist gave
the Secretary's argument short shrift. He distinguished Fry as being based
both on the emergency character of the Economic Stabilization Act and on
the fact that the Act did not displace state wage determinations but merely
froze them at preexisting levels. 6 His opinion also took the further step of
overruling Wirtz, holding that Congress may not "force directly upon the
States its choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of
integral governmental functions are to be made."67
61. Id. at 845.
62. Id. The language is derived ultimately from Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76
(1869).
63. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief could be
granted. 406 F. Supp. 826 (D.D.C. 1974).
64. 426 U.S. at 846.
65. Id. at 851 (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)).
66. Id. at 852-53.
67. Id. at 855.
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C. The Sources of the Theory of Federalism
A year after Usery was decided, Justice Rehnquist had a chance to
clarify his understanding of the sources of the state sovereignty doctrine in
his dissent in Trimble v. Gordon.68 In Trimble, the Supreme Court held
that an Illinois statute permitting illegitimate children to inherit by intes-
tate succession only from their mothers violated the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Referring to history "too well
known to warrant more than brief mention," Rehnquist wrote that
the Framers of the Constitution adopted a system of checks and bal-
ances conveniently lumped under the descriptive head of "federal-
ism," whereby all power was originally presumed to reside in the
people of the States who adopted the Constitution. The Constitution
delegated some authority to the federal executive, some to the federal
legislature, some to the federal judiciary, and reserved the remaining
authority normally associated with sovereignty to .the States and to
the people in the States.69
He went on to assert that although the Civil War Amendments "sharply
altered the balance of power between the Federal and State Govern-
ments," they did so only in specific, historically identifiable ways, and
were not to be construed to affect radically "the original understanding at
Philadelphia."70
The most striking feature of Justice Rehnquist's use of history and
structure is his minimalization of the constitutional effects of the Civil
War. Although he recognizes that the Civil War amendments did work a
change in federal/state relationships, he is concerned to limit the change
to its narrowest justifiable scope. The general rule remains "the original
understanding at Philadelphia"-state freedom from federal interference.
Federal intrusion onto state turf can only be permitted on the basis of a
textually demonstrable delegation of such power.
But history is not the only source of the state sovereignty doctrine for
Justice Rehnquist. In his dissent in Nevada v. Hall,7' he indicated that
federalism is a necessary component of constitutional law for structural as
well as historical reasons.72 In that case Justice Rehnquist disagreed with
the majority's conclusion that a state had no constitutional immunity from
suit in another state's courts and no constitutional right to insist that the
68. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
69. Id. at 777-78 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 778.
71. 440 U.S. 410, 432 (1979).
72. CF C. BLACK, PERSPEcTIVEs IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 20-30, 39-43 (rev. ed. 1970) (implying
a legal doctrine of federalism from structure and organization of Constitution).
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forum state disregard its own public policy on tort compensation in favor
of the defendant's. He argued that the Court frequently has relied on
the implicit ordering of relationships within the federal system neces-
sary to make the Constitution a workable governing charter and to
give each provision within that document the full effect intended by
the Framers. The tacit postulates yielded by that ordering are as
much engrained in the fabric of the document as its express provi-
sions, because without them the Constitution is denied force and
often meaning . . . . The Court's literalism, therefore, cannot be dis-
positive here, and we must examine further the understanding of the
Framers and the consequent doctrinal evolution of concepts of state
sovereignty."'
Applying this methodology to the case, Rehnquist concluded that underly-
ing the Eleventh Amendment is a general rule that states are not subject
to suit absent their consent.1
4
D. Federalism and State Sovereignty
Justice Rehnquist uses the theory of federalism he described in Fry,
Usery, Trimble, and Hail as his constitutional first principle. But Fry and
Usery in particular stand not only for this first principle, but also for a
specific elaboration of it, the doctrine of state sovereignty. That specific
doctrine, unlike the broader theory, has fared poorly in succeeding cases.7"
Only a few days after Usery was decided, the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer.76 The constitutional question in
Fitzpatrick was whether, despite the Eleventh Amendment and the gen-
eral principle of federalism, Congress had the power to authorize an
award of money damages to a private individual against a state govern-
ment found to have subjected that individual to employment discrimina-
tion. Justice Rehnquist's opinions in Fry and Usery had left open the
question of the relationship of state sovereignty to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Writing for a unanimous Court, Rehnquist confronted the issue,
noting that the Amendment's provisions, on their face, run against the
states. He therefore concluded that the Eleventh Amendment, and the
principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, ". . . are necessarily lim-
ited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth
73. Id. at 433-34 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
74. Id. at 437.
75. In the Hodel cases, Transportation Union v. Long Island R.R. Co. and F.E.R.C. v. Missis-
sippi, supra note 36, the Supreme Court rejected arguments that state sovereignty shields state land
use regulation, a state-owned railroad or a state utility commission from federal regulation.
76. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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Amendment." 77
Together, Usery and Fitzpatrick created a state sovereignty doctrine
with fairly definite contours. Congress cannot regulate the states directly
under its commerce power if the state activities affected are either tradi-
tional or essential to the states' functioning, unless (perhaps) the regula-
tion is justified by a national emergency. On the other hand, Congress can
directly "regulate" the states, even in an area protected by state sover-
eignty, when Congress acts to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. But
the precedents supporting this doctrine were never identified. Despite Jus-
tice Rehnquist's bold assertion in Usery that "[t]his Court has never
doubted" the existence of state sovereignty limitations on congressional
power, the wealth of precedent that Justice Brennan marshalled to sup-
port his dissent 8 makes it obvious that the source of the state sovereignty
is one of the doctrine's chief weaknesses.79
In his Fry opinion Justice Rehnquist had refused to rely on the Tenth
Amendment as the constitutional provision creating a state sovereignty
limitation on the commerce power, 0 possibly because of the historical dif-
ficulties with so interpreting that Amendment. The Usery opinion
adopts the same position: The Tenth Amendment is "an express declara-
tion" of the state sovereignty limitation, 2 not its source. But in avoiding
the historical pitfalls associated with linking his state sovereignty doctrine
too closely to the Tenth Amendment, Justice Rehnquist left the doctrine
floating in mid-air, without a visible constitutional foundation other than
his theory of federalism. Rehnquist thereby increased the credibility of
Justice Brennan's remark that "[m]y Brethren thus have today manufac-
tured an abstraction without substance, founded neither in the words of
the Constitution nor on precedent."83
The scope as well as the source of the state sovereignty doctrine remain
ambiguous. Usery did not define any particular state activities other than
the power to determine state employees' wages and hours as essential to
77. Id. at 456.
78. See 426 U.S. at 857-60, 863 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. Justice Brennan's dissent emphasized the novelty, id. at 857, and lack of support in the Con-
stitution's text, id. at 858, or in the Court's decisions, id. at 858, 867, for the majority's position.
80. 421 U.S. at 557.
81. In his dissent in Usery, Justice Brennan referred to the weighty historical evidence against
construing the Tenth Amendment as a limitation on powers expressly delegated to Congress, 426 U.S.
at 861-63. That evidence includes the Marshall Court's decisions upholding an expansive construction
of congressional power, e.g., M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), as well as the
opinions of distinguished early commentators like Justice Story, see, e.g., 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION 1907-08 (2d ed. Boston 1851).
82. 426 U.S. at 842.
83. Id. at 860. Later judicial opinions have tended to resolve this ambiguity in Usery by wedding
the decision to the Tenth Amendment. E.g., Beame v. Friends of the Earth, 434 U.S. 1310, 1311
(1977) (Marshall, Circuit Justice) (Usery was interpretaton of Tenth Amendment); Peel v. Florida
Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070, 1082 (5th Cir. 1979) (same).
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state autonomy. Dicta in the opinion noted that "fire prevention, police
protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation" are "typi-
cal" and "traditional" functions of the states."4 Many of these activities
are carried out primarily by local governments acting under state author-
ity rather than by the state government itself; hence, it would seem logical
that the protections of state sovereignty should extend to these political
subdivisions as well. Otherwise Congress could use its commerce power to
achieve a goal impermissible under Usery-the direct regulation of tradi-
tional state functions-by regulating the local bodies that in fact perform
most of these functions.
Justice Rehnquist has accepted this logic and would extend the doctrine
to protect local governmental units, but most of the other justices have
disagreed. In Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,8" for
example, a cable television operator sued a municipality enjoying home
rule under the Colorado state constitution. 6 The company alleged that a
Boulder ordinance prohibiting it from expanding its business for a three
month period while the city solicited competitors violated the Sherman
Act. The Supreme Court held that the city was subject to Sherman Act.
The Court also ruled that the political subdivision of a state cannot invoke
the state action exemption to the Act recognized in Parker v. Brown87
unless it is implementing a clearly articulated state policy, which Boulder
was not. 8 Justice Rehnquist dissented, in an opinion joined by the Chief
Justice and Justice O'Connor. He argued first that the majority had in-
correctly analyzed the case in terms of an exemption from the Act, instead
of in terms of preemption.' He went on to suggest that a preemption
analysis required upholding the city's ordinance. Rehnquist termed "star-
tling" the majority's conclusion that "our Federalism is in no way impli-
cated when a municipal ordinance is invalidated," adding that "I see no
principled basis to conclude, as does the Court, that municipal ordinances
are more susceptible to invalidation under the Sherman Act than are state
statutes." 9 The Court's opinion, according to Rehnquist, frustrated the
state's decision to permit certain communities to regulate business without
resort to the state government, and was in effect the use of federal judicial
power "to regulate the relationship between the States and their political
84. 426 U.S. at 851.
85. 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
86. A municipality enjoying "home rule" status is entitled to enact a charter and ordinances gov-
erning local matters that within its territorial limits supersede the state's statutes. COLO. CONST. art.
20 § 6.
87. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
88. 102 S. Ct. at 841-43.
89. Id. at 845, 849.
90. Id. at 850.
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subdivisions." 9'
II. Federalism and State Legislative Autonomy
Although Justice Rehnquist and Justise Brennan disagree violently
over the meaning of federalism in constitutional law, Rehnquist would
certainly agree with the observation in Brennan's Usery dissent that "the
paradigm of sovereign action-action qua State" is the creation and en-
forcement of substantive state law. " It follows from Justice Rehnquist's
historical model of the Constitution-the imposition of a federal system on
preexisting states possessing full governmental powers-that federal law-
making is essentially interstitial."3 Even congressional legislation clearly
enacted pursuant to a delegated power and directed to individuals rather
than to the states is, in this model, to be construed narrowly in order to
preserve the autonomy of the states' legislative and judicial power to make
laws in areas not delegated (or exclusively delegated). This essential link
between Justice Rehnquist's concern for federalism and his extraordinary
deference to substantive state law is made most explicit in Rehnquist's
opinion for the Court in Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis
Sand & Gravel Co.9'
The question presented by Corvallis was whether a dispute over the
ownership of lands underlying a navigable river was governed by federal
common law or by Oregon state law. Despite the existence of old Su-
preme Court decisions indicating that federal law should be applied, the
Court held that Oregon law governed the issue. In reaching this conclu-
sion, Justice Rehnquist observed that "[u]nder our federal system, prop-
erty ownership is not governed by a general federal law, but rather by the
laws of the several States.""6 Where a state seeks 'to apply its own law to
resolve a dispute over property claimed by its own instrumentality, its
right to do so is "substantially related to the constitutional sovereignty of
the States."96
The belief that a state has the right to have its law function without
federal interference in the areas reserved to it pervades many other opin-
ions and decisions by Justice Rehnquist. He joined, for example, in Jus-
tice Stewart's majority opinion in Board of Regents v. Roth,97 which
stated that "[p]roperty interests, of course, are not created by the Consti-
91. Id. at 851.
92. 426 U.S. at 875.
93. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER's THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 470-71 (2d ed. 1973).
94. 429 U.S. 363 (1977).
95. Id. at 378.
96. Id. at 381.
97. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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tution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by ex-
isting rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such
as state law . . . ."9 And Justice Rehnquist has taken an active role in
applying the Roth theory to other cases.99
In Paul v. Davis,100 local Kentucky police had distributed to merchants
a flyer that described a number of persons as known, active shoplifters.
The plaintiff was included in the flyer even though he had never been
convicted of shoplifting. The case seemed similar to Wisconsin v. Constan-
tineau,'0 1 which involved a state statute permitting local authorities or rel-
atives to "post" the names of alcoholics who could then be refused the
right to purchase liquor. The Constantineau Court held that the statute
violated the appellee's right to due process. Despite the factual analogies,
however, Justice Rehnquist reached the opposite conclusion in Paul v.
Davis. He distinguished Constantineau by noting that the "posting" of the
alcoholic's name
deprived the individual of a right previously held under state
law-the right to purchase or obtain liquor in common with other
residents. 'Posting,' therefore, significantly altered her status as a
matter of state law, and it was that alteration of legal status which,
combined with the injury resulting from the defamation, justified the
invocation of procedural safeguards.102
In contrast, according to Rehnquist, the defamation by the police of the
respondent in Paul v. Davis infringed no right created by Kentucky law.
Therefore, the due process clause of the Fourtheenth Amendment, which
applies when the state seeks "to remove or significantly alter" a legal right
or status it has created, 03 was inapplicable.
Paul v. Davis only indirectly involved the possibility of intrusion into
the state's sovereign power to make law,' 4 while the Corvallis case in-
volved direct displacement of the state's property law. Each decision, how-
ever, is a logical use of federalism both as a hermeneutical tool and as a
substantive constitutional principle. In each Justice Rehnquist employs
federalism as an instrument for supplying content to constitutional terms
that lack definition, such as "liberty," "property," and "due process." In
98. Id. at 577.
99. E.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 US. 527, 529 n.1 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.) (citing Roth for proposi-
tion that property interests are created by state law and not by federal Constitution).
100. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
101. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
102. 424 U.S. at 708-09 (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 711.
104. A decision against the state, it could be argued, would have forced Kentucky to recognize a
legal right to reputation that Kentucky had declined to enact into law.
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so doing he grounds his constitutional decisionmaking on something other
than his own personal viewpoint, and thus can claim to circumvent the
danger of emotivism. But in order for federalism to be a stable and objec-
tive interpretive device, state law must be accorded autonomy and freedom
from federal interference. Thus both the substantive sovereignty principle
and the hermeneutical theory require the Court, in Justice Rehnquist's
view, to preserve state law against displacement.
Justice Rehnqiust has applied the reasoning of Paul v. Davis to cases in
which the exclusivity of state property law,105 state corporation law'06 and
state family law,' 07 were at stake. But the most dramatic example of Jus-
tice Rehnquist's concern for the autonomy of the states' sovereign law-
making powers is a case in which the substantive result of his position
was arguably contrary to what many perceive to be his conservative
sympathies.
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins'8 involved an attempt by a
group of California high school students to arouse opposition to a United
Nations resolution against Zionism. The students chose a large, privately
owned shopping center, the PruneYard, as the best forum for their pam-
phleteering and petition-circulating efforts. The shopping center's security
personnel requested them to leave pursuant to a company policy. The stu-
dents complied, but later sought an injunction in state court against being
denied access to the PruneYard. The state superior court and court of
appeals denied the injunction, but the California Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the free speech and government petition provisions of the
California Constitution protected the students' activity, subject to reasona-
ble time, place, and manner regulations.' 9
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the decision was af-
firmed. Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist first dismissed the con-
tention that Lloyd v. Tanner"0° compelled reversal. Lloyd had rejected the
argument that the federal Constitution forbade a privately owned shop-
105. See Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 82 (1978) (state law does not make attend-
ance at state medical school a protected property right).
106. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 822 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (state law grants corporations perpetual life and limited liability for economic purposes and de-
nies them certain political rights unrelated to those purposes); c. Citizens Against Rent Control/
Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 102 S. Ct. 434, 439 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring) (Bellotti dissent viewed limitation of political rights as quid pro quo for economic benefits of-
fered by state law to corporations).
107. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 591 (1979) (Stewart, J., joined by Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (state law governs division of retirement benefits received under 1974 Railroad Retire-
ment Act upon dissolution of marriage); accord Santasky v. Kramer, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (evidentiary standard in child neglect proceedings); McCarty v. McCarty,
453 U.S. 210, 236 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (military retirement benefits).
108. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
109. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979).
110. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
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ping center from enforcing a handbilling prohibition on its premises. But
Rehnquist pointed out that nothing in Lloyd itself limited "the authority
of the State to exercise its police power or its sovereign right to adopt in
its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those con-
ferred by the Federal Constitution.""'
Faithful to the doctrine promulgated in Roth that it is state, not federal,
law that creates the property rights protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Justice Rehnquist found that the regulation of the PruneYard own-
er's property rights did not amount to a "taking" in the Fifth Amendment
sense. He distinguished Kaiser Aetna v. United States,"' in which the
Court struck down as a "taking" a federal attempt to compel free public
use of a private marina that was connected to federally controlled naviga-
ble water, in part on the ground that the government interference with
private property interests in PruneYard had created the property right in
the first place. Unlike the federal government, the states possess "residual
authority that enables [them] . .. to define 'property' in the first in-
stance.""' This fact, and California's possession of a "sovereign right '""
to adopt and construe its own constitution, justified the application of an
undemanding rational means test to the California court's action."5
The final contention of the PruneYard appellants was that requiring
them to permit the students limited access to their property would force
the appellants to appear to espouse the views of others, in violation of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Rehnquist pointed out that in
cases cited by the PruneYard appellants, such as Wooley v. Maynard"
and Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,"'7 the state had prescribed
the content of the messages forced on the appellants. In contrast, the opin-
ions at issue in PruneYard were those of other private parties, and the
shopping center owner remained free to disclaim connection with any
views those parties expressed." 8
PruneYard was a significant test of the depth of Justice Rehnquist's
federalism convictions. If his theory of federalism were merely a surrogate
or disguise for a simple conservative politics,"9 this case would have been
more happily resolved from his viewpoint by a reversal. The appellants'
111. 447 U.S. at 81.
112. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
113. 447 U.S. at 84.
114. Id. at 81.
115. Id. at 85.
116. 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding unconstitutional New Hampshire requirement that motto
"Live Free or Die" be displayed on automobile license plates).
117. 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding unconstitutional Florida requirement that newspapers publish
political candidates' replies to editorial criticism free of charge).
118. 447 U.S. at 87-88.
119. See Shapiro, supra note 11, at 294.
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arguments were not without reason or analogical support from earlier de-
cisions. Indeed, PruneYard seems quite similar to Kaiser Aetna and
Wooley. In Kaiser Aetna, a government was also seeking to deprive pri-
vate parties of the free and exclusive use of their own property, con-
structed with their funds. And in Wooley, as in PruneYard, the party
upon whom a message was being forced was not in fact being forced af-
firmatively to say or appear to say anything and in any event was free to
advertise his or her disagreement with the views being expressed.' 0 On
the other hand, Rehnquist's federalism principle seems to lead inexorably
to the result in PruneYard, for what greater intrusion on the states' sover-
eign authority to make law could there be than a federal decision forbid-
ding them to ensure their citizens' personal liberties by constitutional
guarantees?
III. "His Federalism:" Justice Rehnquist and Procedural Deference to
State Courts
Justice Rehnquist's state sovereignty doctrine has not commanded uni-
versal or uniform support from his brethren. Although four other Justices
joined his Usery opinion, subsequent decisions have failed to implement
the broad constitutional principle Rehnquist attempted to establish in
Usery. His fight to create a wide sphere of autonomy for state substantive
law has had a similarly checkered career. But his call for enhanced federal
deference to state procedure has met with greater support from other
members of the Court.
Justice Rehnquist did not initiate the Court's expansion of its various
techniques for relegating litigants to state courts, but he has played an
increasingly important role in their elaboration. Before 1971, the Supreme
Court recognized three distinct but related situations in which a federal
court could decline to proceed even though it possessed jurisdiction: (1)
Pullman abstention-where a case presenting a federal constitutional is-
sue might be disposed of by state court determination of pertinent state
law questions;'"' (2) Burford abstention-where a federal decision would
affect substantial state policy decisions or interfere unduly with the state's
administration of its own laws;' 22 and (3) situations in which difficult and
unsettled questions of state law must be resolved.' 23 Justice Rehnquist has
120. See 430 U.S. at 722 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
121. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
122. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
123. In Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943), the Court rejected the position
that mere difficulty in deciding a state law question itself justifies abstention. The present scope and
authoritativeness of Winter Haven, however, is questionable. See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 225-29 (3d ed. 1976); Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA.
L. REV. 590 (1977).
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followed a middle road in cases involving these types of abstention, joining
majorities spanning the Court's ideological spectrum in ordering absten-
tion. 12  And somewhat surprisingly, he has warned against automatic re-
sort to the similar procedure of certification of state law questions to state
supreme courts, despite the compatibility of that procedure with the "con-
siderations of comity and cooperative federalism which are inherent in a
federal system . . . .
Justice Rehnquist has taken much less of a backseat position, however,
in the development of a different type of abstention-the doctrine stem-
ming from the 1971 decisions in Younger v. Harris'6 and its companion
cases,12 7 and often referred to as "Our Federalism."'' 2 1 Younger held that a
federal court should abstain from enjoining a criminal prosecution that
was begun in state court prior to the filing of the federal action, absent a
showing that the injunction is necessary to avoid "immediate and irrepa-
rable injury" to the federal plaintiff or to counter bad faith on the state's
part. 2 9 Since joining the Supreme Court, Justice Rehnquist has argued
for the abandonment of all four of the specific limitations to Younger pre-
sent in the original opinion. Stripped of these specificities, Younger be-
comes a universal, constitutionalized doctrine. It is no longer a self-im-
posed limitation on the chancellor's discretion, but a necessary
consequence of the Constitution's federalist first principles. To a remarka-
ble extent, Rehnquist has carried a majority of the Court with him in his
crusade to universalize Younger. He has authored two opinions for the
Court holding the Younger principle applicable in situations in which no
state court was involved."10 Several other Rehnquist opinions for the Court
have applied Younger where a state civil action, not a criminal prosecu-
tion, was at stake.'31 He has participated significantly in the Court's ero-
sion of the original Younger requirement that the state proceeding ante-
date the filing of the federal suit in order to be protected from federal
interference.12 Only in his recently articulated desire to extend Younger
124. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) (Stew-
art, Blackmun, & Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (concurrent state court proceeding justified dismissal of
federal action); Harris County Comm'rs' Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing) (abstention appropriate when state court construction of state statute could moot federal constitu-
tional challenge).
125. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
126. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
127. See Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 US. 200 (1971); Perez v.
Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66
(1971). All these decisions were handed down with Younger on February 23, 1971.
128. See generally Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103 (1977).
129. 401 U.S. at 54; see Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 69 (1971).
130. See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 102 S. Ct. 177 (1981); Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
131. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
132. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
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to federal instrumentalities other than courts has Rehnquist's program
thus far been rebuffed."' Behind all of this judicial activism, Rehnquist's
federalist presuppostion can be easily discerned: national interference with
state activities is anomalous in a federal system and is to be judicially
disfavored.
A. The Principle of Comity Takes on a New Shape
The original Younger decision was predicated on the need for comity
between the federal and state courts. Regular federal interference with
state criminal proceedings seemed to Justice Black to betray a distrust of
state judges incompatible with the equal dignity due them under "Our
Federalism." This quite traditional concern for comity between courts
does not arise when the state courts are not involved, and Younger on its
face seems inapplicable in such situations. Nevertheless, it was in just
such a situation that the Supreme Court undertook a major expansion of
the scope of the Younger doctrine. The decision, Rizzo v. Goode,' was
written by Justice Rehnquist. The federal district court in Rizzo ordered
Philadelphia city and police officials to devise and submit for its approval
a program for dealing with complaints about police misconduct. The court
of appeals affirmed. Justice Rehnquist's opinion reversed the lower courts,
based in part on the familiar "principles of . . . federalism": 3
Thus the principles of federalism which play such an important
part in governing the relationship between federal courts and state
governments, though initially expounded and perhaps entitled to
their greatest weight in cases where it was sought to enjoin a crimi-
nal prosecution in progress, have not been limited either to that situ-
ation or indeed to a criminal proceeding itself. We think these prin-
ciples likewise have applicability where injunctive relief is sought,
not against the judicial branch of the state government, but against
those in charge of an executive branch of an agency of state or local
governments such as petitioners here.'36
Rizzo thus represents a startling expansion of "Our Federalism." It com-
pletely cut loose the Younger doctrine from the considerations of comity
between federal and state courts and from the traditional restraints on the
exercise of equity powers in relation to criminal proceedings out of which
it had been born only five years earlier.
133. See United Credit Bureau of America, Inc. v. NLRB, 102 S. Ct. 539 (1981) (mem.) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
134. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
135. Id. at 379.
136. Id. at 380.
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Rizzo's expansion of Younger was reconfirmed in Fair Assessment in
Real Estate Association v. McNary,11' another opinion written by Justice
Rehnquist. In McNary the Court affirmed lower court holdings that state
taxpayers could not bring a damages action under the Force Act of
1871,13 to redress the allegedly unconstitutional administration of the
Missouri state tax system. The lower federal courts reached their deci-
sions relying partially on the Tax Injunction Act,139 and partially on the
principle of comity.140 Justice Rehnquist's opinion, however, did not even
reach the question of the Act's application; instead, Rehnquist chose to
rely entirely on the federalism principle that he found "reflect[ed]" in the
Tax Injunction Act and on the principle of comity articulated in Younger.
"This legislation, and the decisions of this Court which preceded it, reflect
the fundamental principle of comity between federal courts and state gov-
ernments that is essential to 'Our Federalism,' particularly in the area of
state taxation. ')141
Rehnquist justified applying a doctrine originally based on traditional
considerations of equity jurisprudence to an action at law for damages by
distinguishing between the Younger rule proper and the "fundamental
principle" it expresses. "Although these modern expressions of comity
have been limited in their application to federal cases which seek to enjoin
state judicial proceedings, a limitation which we do not abandon here,
they illustrate the principles that bar petitioners' suit under § 1983." 141
The Younger rule is thus limited to cases involving an attempt to enjoin
state court proceedings, but since the Younger principle is subject to no
such restraint, the "limitation" is effectively meaningless.
After Rizzo and McNary, the Younger doctrine can apparently func-
tion as a freewheeling judicial metaprinciple, available to trump virtually
any federal equitable intervention into the affairs of state or local govern-
ments. This is a radical departure from the practice of the federal courts
for many years, and indeed some of the Justices in Rizzo may not have
intended for the decision to have such far-reaching effects. Read at face
value, however, Rizzo is a perfectly logical extension of Justice Rehn-
quist's federalism doctrine. In a federal system consisting of sovereign
states protected from direct federal regulation in all but a few narrrow
areas, interference with state activities by the national judiciary is clearly
unacceptable, except in the most unusual of situations. In a recent dissent
from the Court's denial of certiorari in United Credit Bureau of America,
137. 102 S. Ct. 177 (1981).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980).
139. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
140. 102 S. Ct. at 186.
141. Id. at 179.
142. Id. at 184.
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Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board,'4 3 Justice Rehnquist argued that
the Younger principle should restrain not only federal courts but also fed-
eral agencies from interference with state processes. In United Credit Bu-
reau, the NLRB had found that the petitioner had committed an unfair
labor practice by filing a damages action in state court against a dis-
charged employee who had filed a complaint with the Board. It ordered
the petitioner to dismiss its state court action and pay the employee's legal
expenses. The Fourth Circuit enforced the order and the Supreme Court
refused to review the case. Justice Rehnquist's elaborate dissent on the
merits states that "principles of federalism and comity should preclude the
NLRB from [enjoining] . . .a state court damages action between two
private entities . . . ." Once again his view was founded not on an ex-
plicit legal provision but on an underlying principle: "Federal interference
with the States' judicial processes is no less contrary to the policies under-
lying [the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C.] § 2283 if that interference
comes from a federal agency rather than from a federal court."' 44
B. The Disappearance of the Limitation to Criminal Proceedings
Rizzo and McNary not only extended Younger beyond its original con-
cern with comity between courts, but also abandoned its limitation to
criminal proceedings, which reflected Younger's roots in ancient equity
doctrine. When the Court in later cases rested Younger solely on consider-
ations of federalism, such a limitation no longer made sense. Its abandon-
ment was presaged in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.141 In that case, the Court
had to decide whether "Our Federalism" is relevant in the context, not of
state criminal proceedings, but of civil actions in state courts in which
state officials are seeking to enforce state laws. In Huffman, Ohio county
officials had obtained a state court order declaring a theater that was ex-
hibiting allegedly pornographic films a nuisance and closing it for a year.
Without appealing the state judgment, the theater sought a federal injunc-
tion against enforcement of the state court's order. A three-judge district
court, without considering Younger, granted the injunction. The Supreme
Court reversed, in an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, holding that
the district court should have applied the Younger standard to decide
whether an injunction should issue.'4 The dissenters contended that
Youngers application of the traditional doctrine of equity that the chan-
cellor will not restrain a criminal prosecution was inapplicable to a civil
proceeding. In answer, Justice Rehnquist stressed the primacy of federal-
143. See supra note 133.
144. Id. at 539, 541.
145. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
146. Id. at 595-99, 611.
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ism considerations in the Younger doctrine, considerations that mandated
"standards of restraint that go well beyond those of private equity juris-
prudence."'47 This primary federalism "component" to Younger applies
"to a civil proceeding such as this quite as much as . . . to a criminal
proceeding."' 4 He also reasoned that the state proceeding in Huffman
was "in important respects . . more akin to a criminal prosecution than
are most civil cases."149 The federal court's intervention in such proceed-
ings disrupts the "State's efforts to protect the very interests which under-
lie its criminal laws and to obtain compliance with precisely the standards
which are embodied in its criminal laws." 50
Huffman nonetheless purported to preserve the limitation of Younger
to criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings. This limitation was formally
abandoned in Juidice v. Vail."' The appellees in Juidice had been held in
contempt by New York courts for failing to satisfy judgments against
them in several New York civil actions. A federal district court enjoined
enforcement of the contempt proceedings.
Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist conceded that the district
court's reading of the precedents was "not an implausible" one, but went
on to state that "the principles of Younger and Huffman are not confined
solely to the types of state actions which were sought to be enjoined in
those cases." 1 2 After Juidice, the federal decision whether to intervene is
no longer to depend on whether the state action is a criminal or quasi-
criminal proceeding, but is to be resolved so as to preserve the freedom of
"the States and their institutions . . to perform their separate functions
in their separate ways." '53 While the opinion claimed to reserve the ques-
tion of Youngers general applicability to all civil litigation, 54 it leaves no
principled reason for declining to extend Younger to all state court
proceedings. 15
C. The State Gets a Headstart in the Race to the Courthouse
The Younger decision, by stressing which judicial proceeding com-
147. Id. at 603.
148. Id. at 604.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 605 (footnote omitted).
151. 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
152. Id. at 334.
153. Id. (citing Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 601 (1975), which, in turn, quoted
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)).
154. 430 U.S. at 336 n.13.
155. Justice Brennan wrote, "I suspect that the purported disclaimer. . . is tongue in cheek" and
a cover "for the ultimate goal of denying § 1983 plaintiffs the federal forum in any case, civil or
criminal, when a pending state proceeding may hear the federal plaintiff's federal claims." Id. at 344-
45 & n.* (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979) (Younger abstention
appropriate when state proceeding involves custody of children).
1340
Vol. 91: 1317, 1982
Compleat Jeffersonian
mences first-the federal suit or the state prosecution-seemed to invite a
'"race to the courthouse." Since 1971 the Court has labored to reduce this
element in the Younger doctrine by making it increasingly easy for the
state to win the "race." In Hicks v. Miranda.6 Justice Rehnquist joined
Justice White's opinion for the Court, which held that Younger applies
"where state criminal proceedings are begun against the federal plaintiffs
after the federal complaint is filed but before any proceedings of substance
on the merits have taken place in the federal court."' 157 Four Justices dis-
sented, attacking the holding as a radical skewing of the balances estab-
lished in Younger between competing state and federal interests in favor
of the state officials.
15 8
Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed the principle established in Hicks in his
majority opinion for the Court in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.'5 9 The appel-
lees were three corporations operating bars with topless dancers in North
Hempstead, New York. After the town enacted an ordinance making this
illegal, the three corporations brought a federal action seeking a declara-
tion of the ordinance's unconstitutionality. After the federal court denied
their request for a temporary restraining order, one bar reintroduced top-
less dancing and was served with criminal summonses by town officials.
Thereafter, the district court found the ordinance unconstitutional and en-
joined any proceedings under it. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion rejected the appeals court's rationale-the
need to avoid conflicting outcomes and conserve judicial energy-as insuf-
ficient to overcome "the claims of federalism."' 160 With respect to the bar
that reintroduced topless dancing, he reasoned that "[w]hen the criminal
summonses [were] issued . . . the federal litigation was in an embryonic
stage and no contested matter had been decided."'' In such circumstances,
Younger and Hicks v. Miranda barred both injunctive and declaratory
relief. The Court went on to affirm the granting of declaratory and tem-
porary injunctive relief to the other. two respondents.
D. The Eleventh Amendment
The Constitution does, of course, contain an explicit restriction on the
application of federal power to the states, in the Eleventh Amendment. In
his Fry opinion, Justice Rehnquist noted that Eleventh Amendment "re-
156. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
157. See id. at 349.
158. Id. at 357 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
159. 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
160. Id. at 928.
161. Id. at 929.
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flects" the principles of federalism that bind and inform constitutional in-
terpretation." 2 As in his treatment of the Tenth Amendment, however,
Rehnquist does not derive these principles from an exegesis of the Amend-
ment's language, and so he follows a rather sinuous path in the Court's
Eleventh Amendment cases. While in several decisions he has joined a
majority on the Court in rejecting Eleventh Amendment claims, he has
not done so in every case. He joined the Court's opinion in the Missouri
Public Health & Welfare Employees Case, which held that congressional
exercise of the commerce power against the states lifts the latter's Elev-
enth Amendment immunity as long as there is "clear language that the
constitutional immunity had been swept away."163 He also joined in the
holding of Scheuer v. Rhodes"6 4 that the Eleventh Amendment does not
bar an action for damages against state officials under the 1871 Ku Klux
Klan Act. Rehnquist wrote the opinion of the Court in Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, which held that the Eleventh Amendment and its underlying state
sovereignty rationale "are necessarily limited by the enforcement provi-
sions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 1" Similarly, in Milliken v.
Bradley""6 he agreed with the decision that, notwithstanding the Eleventh
Amendment, a district court could order state-funded remedial educational
programs for children found to have been subjected to past acts of de jure
segregation.
In Edelman v. Jordan,'67 however, Justice Rehnquist wrote an opinion
for the Court upholding an Eleventh Amendment claim. The Edelman
plaintiffs successfully argued in district court that Illinois officials ad-
ministering an aid program with joint federal-state funding were violating
federal regulatory requirements. The court ordered the defendants to
abide by the federal regulations and to pay all benefits wrongfully with-
held after the promulgation of the regulations. The Seventh Circuit af-
firmed, rejecting the officials' claim that the Eleventh Amendment barred
the award of retroactive benefits. Justice Rehnquist's opinion reviewed the
history of the Eleventh Amendment, its extension in Hans v. Louisiana,"6 8
and the exception for suits seeking prospective relief created in Ex parte
Young.69 He concluded that "[t]he funds to satisfy the award in this case
must inevitably come from the general revenues of the State of Illinois,
162. 421 U.S. 542, 556-57 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
163. Employees v. Missouri Dep't of Public Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973).
164. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
165. 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
166. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
167. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
168. 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (federal judicial power does not extend to suit directly against state by one
of its own citizens absent that state's consent).
169. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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and thus the award resembles far more closely the monetary award
against the State itself [prohibited by the Amendment and by Hans]...
than it does the prospective, injunctive relief awarded in Ex Parte
Young.' 7
0
On remand, the district court ordered the state officials to send each
member of the plaintiffs' class a notice stating that he or she had been
illegally denied benefits. The appeals court reversed, holding that the spe-
cific form of notice required in the district court's order was barred by the
Eleventh Amendment, but that on remand the lower court could order the
officials to send a simple explanatory note concerning state procedures
available. When the case once again came up for Supreme Court review,
as Quern v. Jordan, Justice Rehnquist again wrote for the Court, which
upheld the appeals court's order as "ancillary to the prospective relief al-
ready ordered," and thus within the Ex Parte Young exception.
E. Conclusion
Justice Rehnquist's role in the evolution of the Younger principle of
"Our Federalism" and in the revival of the Eleventh Amendment has
been central both to the Court's decisions and to his own development of
the meaning of federalism as a constitutional first principle. Younger, ac-
cording to the interpretation Rehnquist gave it in Rizzo and McNary, is
an exact parallel to Usery. Just as the state sovereignty invoked in Usery
bars federal legislative interference with state legislative decisions, so
Younger, Rizzo, and McNary bar federal judicial interference with state
judicial or executive process. Similarly, Edelman v. Jordan prohibits the
federal courts from vindicating federal statutory rights by making de-
mands on the state exchequer except pursuant to congressional enforce-
ment of the Fourteenth Amendment. Taken to their logical extremes,
these doctrines would create an almost impenetrable sphere of state auton-
omy, open to federal interference at only two points. One is the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions involving federal
questions. The other is Congress' enforcement power under the Civil War
Amendments. Justice Rehnquist has indicated a desire to interpret the
Court's jurisdiction narrowly,17' but has concentrated his efforts on at-
tempting to patch up the Fourteenth Amendment chink in the states' fed-
eralism armor.
The most potent statutory intrusion into state autonomy under the Civil
War Amendments is the Force Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although
170. 415 U.S. at 665.
171. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 434 U.S. 241, 244 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (when state court judgment arguably rests on both state and federal grounds, Supreme
Court should not take jurisdiction unless it is obvious that decision was based on federal law).
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the Younger line of cases has severely cut back on the scope of section
1983, it has not vitiated the statute completely, due to the continuing va-
lidity of Monroe v. Pape's holding that an individual seeking federal pro-
tection under the statute need not seek state judicial vindication of his or
her federal rights before going into federal court.7 2 As might be expected,
Justice Rehnquist has hinted strongly that he would overrule Monroe v.
Pape and require aggrieved persons to exhaust their state remedies before
invoking the 1871 Act." 3
This negative attitude toward federal protection of individual liberties
flows quite naturally from Rehnquist's federalism and does not necessa-
rily stem from an antipathy toward civil and political rights in general. Its
perspective is that of Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore :4
it is the states, and not the federal government, which are the source and
should be the protectors of individual liberties. For Rehnquist, the section
1983 exception to this general rule is anomalous and should be construed
as narrowly as possible." 5 In his view, it is an "obvious precept" that
litigants "seeking protection of federal rights in federal courts should be
remitted to their state remedies if their federal rights will not thereby be
lost."'76
The flip side of Justice Rehnquist's belief in the autonomy of state pro-
cedure is his belief that state courts should be in a position of complete
parity with federal courts. Rehnquist thus has enthusiastically endorsed
the assumption at least nominally shared by all the Justices that state
courts are equal to federal courts in their ability and willingness to vindi-
cate federal rights. 77 In General Atomic Co. v. Felter77 he went beyond
172. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
173. In dissenting from the Court's denial of certiorari in City of Columbus v. Leonard, 443 U.S.
905 (1979), Justice Rehnquist suggested that "the time may now be ripe for a reconsideration of the
Court's conclusion in Monroe. . .as to exhaustion of state remedies." Id. at 910-11. Justice Rehn-
quist's willingness to restrict the availability of § 1983 is, logically, paralleled by opposition to ex-
panding the statute's scope. Thus, he joined Justice Powell's dissent in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S.
1 (1980). The Thiboutot majority held that § 1983 encompasses claims based on purely statutory
federal rights. Powell's dissent argued, in true Rehnquistian spirit, that the holding "creates a major
new intrustion into state sovereignty under our federal system." Id. at 33.
174. 32 U.S (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (first eight amendments inapplicable to states).
175. See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 102 S. Ct. 177 (1981).
176. Id. at 186 n.8. Justice Rehnquist's desire to channel litigants into state courts is based on his
constitutional commitment to the states as the primary loci of governmental power and authority, not
on empirical assertions about the competence or zeal of state judges. The argument that state judges
on the whole are not as solicitous of federal rights in practice, set forth in Neuborne, supra note 26,
misses the point as far as Rehnquist is concerned. To the Justice the proper question to ask is not
"How can federally guaranteed rights best be protected?" but rather "In a federal system in which
the states are primary and the central government secondary, which government's courts should ordi-
narily exercise jurisdiction?"
177. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 430 (1979); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 610-11
(1975).
178. 434 U.S. 12 (1977).
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any of his colleagues in suggesting that state courts should be able to exer-
cise the same injunctive authority granted to the federal courts by the
Anti-Injunction Act, 179 "where necessary in aid of [their] jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate [their] judgments."18 0 The case arose out of the many-
fold increase in the market price of uranium in the early 1970's. United
Nuclear Corp. (UNC) was under contract to supply petitioner GAO with
uranium; when rising costs in prices rendered the contract unremunera-
tive UNC stopped delivery and in August 1975 filed a complaint in a
New Mexico district court seeking a declaratory judgment releasing it
from the contract. On March 15, 1976, the state court granted UNC an
ex parte temporary order restraining GAO from suing UNC, and on
April 2 issued a preliminary injunction to that effect, excepting two ac-
tions previously filed in a federal court in New Mexico. GAO asked the
New Mexico Supreme Court to stay the injunction by writ, which the
high court did pending oral argument, after which it quashed the writ.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment and
remanded the case so that the New Mexico Supreme Court could decide
whether its decision was based on federal or state grounds. The state court
held that the injunction was within the state district court's inherent eq-
uity powers and did not contravene the federal Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court, citing Donovan v. Dallas,"" sum-
marily reversed. Justice Rehnquist was the sole dissenter. Rehnquist sug-
gested a reexamination of Donovan's holding that state courts lack the
power to restrain federal proceedings in actions in personam. According to
Rehnquist, Donovan was based on the general rule of federalist comity
that state and federal courts should not interfere with one another's pro-
ceedings. 8 ' But "such a general rule of parity implies that, where a fed-
eral district court has power to enjoin the institution of proceedings in
state court, a state court must have a similar power to forbid the initiation
of vexatious litigation in federal court." 1 3
General Atomic Co. is, in a sense, the high water mark of Justice
Rehnquist's procedural federalism. Starting from the generally accepted
179. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976).
180. General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12, 20 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 2283 (1976)).
181. 377 U.S. 408 (1964).
182. 434 U.S. at 19-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 20. The state district court persisted in acting as though Justice Rehnquist's dissent
had been the opinion of the Court. After remand, GAC filed a request with the American Arbitration
Association for arbitration under federal law, and requested the state court to stay its proceedings.
UNC replied by moving that the court enjoin the arbitration proceedings. The district court denied
the motion to stay and granted the injunction. GAC then filed a motion in the United States Supreme
Court for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the state court to abide by the
Supreme Court's earlier ruling. The motion was summarily granted without dissent. See 436 U.S.
493 (1978).
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principle that federal-state comity may at times restrain federal courts
from interfering in state court proceedings, Justice Rehnquist has come to
the extraordinary conclusion that federalism requires federal courts to ab-
stain from conducting their own proceedings when a state court interferes.
IV. Justice Rehnquist and Limits on Federal Power
John Taylor, one of the great theoreticians of Jeffersonian republican-
ism, wrote in 1823 that
Communities possessed of sufficient knowledge to discriminate be-
tween liberty and slavery have uniformly labored to invest govern-
ments with a portion of power sufficient to secure social happiness,
but insufficient for its destruction. 184
A characteristic American response to the conundrum posed in the quo-
tation above has been to emphasize state sovereignty. This solution fell
into desuetude after the 1937 "constitutional revolution," and Justice
Rehnquist has devoted much energy to reviving it. But there is another,
equally traditional device for restricting a potentially oppressive federal
authority-the doctrine of enumerated powers. Another nineteenth cen-
tury Jeffersonian asked "What, then, is the Government of the United
States? . . .Unlike the governments of the States, which have been insti-
tuted to secure generally the unalienable rights of man, it has only the
enumerated objects and is restrained from passing beyond them by the
express reservation of all undelegated functions."'' Expressed in the
Tenth Amendment,', this concept of the federal government has played
an important role in American history. Like its federalism counterpart,
however, the doctrine of a limited federal government had lost most of its
vitality by the time William Rehnquist was appointed to the Supreme
Court.87
Justice Rehnquist's work on the Court indicates that he has undertaken
184. J. TAYLOR, NEW VIEWS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1823), quoted in 5
THE ANNALS OF AMERICA 88-89 (1968).
185. 2 J. DAVIS, RISE AND FALL OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 453 (1881).
186. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
187. Professor Martin Diamond wrote:
For decades the limiting doctrine of delegated and enumerated powers has been eroded, and
the scope of national government had been vastly expanded.. . . [T]hose who are concerned to
preserve the federalism in the American compound remain concerned to limit the growth of
national government relative to the states, as one indispensable support for that federalism. To
this end, it is especially necessary to restore the moral and intellectual bona fides of the consti-
tutional doctrine of enumerated powers as a crucial resource for limiting that growth.
Diamond, The Federalist on Federalism: "Neither a National Nor a Federal Constitution, But a
Composition of Both," 86 YALE L.J. 1273, 1283 (1977).
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the task of restoring the vitality of the doctrine of enumerated powers. As
with his federalism principle, the historical basis of the doctrine is impor-
tant to Justice Rehnquist.' 8 He is, of course, unhappily aware of the doc-
trine's gradual disappearance from the Court's jurisprudence:
[O]ne of the greatest "fictions" of our federal system is that Congress
exercises only those powers delegated to it, while the remainder are
reserved to the States or to the people. . . . Although it is clear that
the people, through the States, delegated authority to Congress to
"regulate Commerce . . . among the several states," . . . one could
easily get the sense from this Court's opinions that the federal system
exists only at the sufferance of Congress.' 9
Justice Rehnquist has proposed a number of devices that would confine
Congress to the exercise of only "those powers delegated to it." He has
endorsed the rehabilitation of the pre-New Deal nondelegation doctrine,
arguing in a recent case that a provision of the 1970 Occupational Safety
& Health Act was an impermissible delegation of legislative authority to
an executive officer."' He has marshalled a majority of the Justices to
support a holding that "if Congress intends to impose a condition on the
grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously. 19' And he has
insisted on applying a higher level of scrutiny to federal legislation than to
state action. Federal and state laws are both subject to judicial review to
determine whether some constitutional limitation on the relevant govern-
ment has been violated. Since federal, but not state, power is specifically
enumerated, Rehnquist argues that courts must entertain attacks on fed-
eral, but not state, laws based on the claim that Congress has exceeded its
grant of authority.'9 2 But Rehnquist's major efforts to reinvigorate the
idea of limited federal government have been in the areas of the commerce
clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.
188. "The First Amendment was adopted. . . at a time when the Federal Government was in a
real sense considered a government of limited delegated powers. Indeed, the principal argument
against adopting the Constitution without a "Bill of Rights" was not that such an enactment would be
undesirable, but that it was unnecessary because of the limited nature of the Federal Government."
Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 721 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
189. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 307-08 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist's opinion concurs in the judgments in both Virginia
Mining, and Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
190. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671-88
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
191. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
192. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 312-13 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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A. The Commerce Clause
The commerce clause has been prominently linked with Justice Rehn-
quist's federalism since the two collided in Usery. That decision, however,
purported to discern no new internal limits to the congressional commerce
power, which it stated is "plenary." '193 Userys holding that Congress
would not extend federal minimum wage/maximum hour requirements to
state employees was "not because Congress . . . lack[s] an affirmative
grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the Consti-
tution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that manner."' 194 In
terms of Rehnquist's theory of judicial review, the federal action in Usery
was invalidated because it transgressed a constitutional limit on federal
legislation, and not because it exceeded the Constitution's affirmative
grant of authority over interstate commerce to Congress.
But even in Usery the distinction between challenging "the breadth of
authority granted Congress under the commerce power" and asserting "an
affirmative limitation on the exercise" of that power proved difficult to
maintain. 95 At times the Usery opinion seems to admit that its state sover-
eignty doctrine can be read as a limit on the commerce power internal to
the commerce clause. 96 This is more than just a semantic point; later
cases increasingly call into question the seriousness of Justice Rehnquist's
commitment to the post-1937 orthodoxy that the commerce power is
plenary.
Justice Rehnquist insists that his higher level scrutiny of federal legisla-
tion requires the Court to examine critically the connection with interstate
commerce that Congress asserts as the basis for its legislative competence.
In short, unlike the reserved police powers of the States, which are
plenary unless challenged as violating some specific provision of the
Constitution, the connection with interstate commerce is itself a ju-
risdictional prerequisite for any substantive legislation by Congress
under the Commerce Clause. 9"
193. 426 U.S. at 840.
194. Id. at 845.
195. Id. at 841.
196. "We hold that insofar as the challenged amendments operate to directly displace the States'
freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not
within the authority granted Congress by Art. I, § 8, d. 3." Id. at 852. "Interference with integral
governmental services provided by. . . subordinate arms of a state government is therefore beyond the
reach of congressional power under the Commerce Clause." Id. at 855-56 n.20. The nationalist tradi-
tion of viewing the commerce power as plenary, which dates back to the Marshall Court, seems to
have forced Justice Rehnquist to avoid recognizing explicitly that his state sovereignty doctrine func-
tions in the same way that an "internal" limit to the commerce clause would. Although he struggles
mightily to endorse both plenary congressional power and state autonomy, his effort fails even rhetori-
cally, as the quotations in this footnote illustrate.
197. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 265, 311 (1981) (Rehn-
1348
Vol. 91: 1317, 1982
Compleat Jeffersonian
Rehnquist's negative attitude toward the exercise of the commerce power
combined with his solicitude for the plenary legislative authority reserved
to the states makes him extremely reluctant to find that state law is inva-
lid either because it conflicts with federal legislation or with the commerce
clause's latent scope.
In Jones v. Rath Packing Co. 98 and Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,'99
Justice Rehnquist made it clear that under his view of the commerce
clause, congressional preemption of a field of commerce law is not to be
inferred lightly. In Rath Packing, the Court decided inter alia that the
federal Fair Packing & Labeling Act implicitly preempted a California
statute restricting the weight variations allowed in packaged flour. Re-
jecting this holding, Justice Rehnquist wrote: "This latter pre-emption is
founded in unwarranted speculations that hardly rise to that clear demon-
stration of conflict that must exist before the mere existence of a federal
law may be said to pre-empt state law operating in the same field. 200 Ray
involved the constitutionality of Washington State's Tanker Law. A fed-
eral district court held the law void in its entirety due to preemption by
the federal Ports & Waterways Safety Act. The Supreme Court upheld
parts of the Washington law, but affirmed the lower court's judgment as
to the rest. Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Marshall's opinion dissenting
as to the invalidation of the provision of the Tanker Law prohibiting the
operation in Puget Sound of tankers exceeding 125,000 deadweight tons.
The separate opinion argued both that the federal Act did not of its own
force conflict with the state size limitation, and that it had not been
demonstrated that the Department of Transportation had addressed the
issue in its regulations promulgated under the Act. Since the size limit had
not been shown to be an irrational means of protecting human and envi-
ronmental safety, or substantially burdensome on foreign commerce, fed-
eral preemption should not be inferred. 0
The Court's role in reviewing state legislation under the commerce
clause where there is no federal statute at all should be even more limited,
according to Justice Rehnquist. In Hughes v. Oklahoma,0 2 the appellant
was arrested by a state game warden for violating an Oklahoma statute
prohibiting the transportation out-of-state of minnows taken from their
natural habitat in commercially significant numbers. Hughes was con-
victed and the conviction was affirmed by the state Court of Criminal
Appeals. The United States Supreme Court reversed, stating that the law
quist, J., concurring).
198. 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
199. 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
200. 430 U.S. at 544 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
201. 435 U.S. at 180-87 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
202. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
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on its face discriminated against interstate commerce, and was not the
least discriminatory means available to achieve the state's goal of conserv-
ing its wildlife. The Court's opinion recalled that the commerce clause
reflects one of the principle goals of the Constitutional Convention: "[T]he
conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid
the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations
among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Con-
federation.""2 3 The importance of this constitutional goal and the facially
discriminatory nature of the state statute warranted "the strictest
scrutiny. 2..
Justice Rehnquist was unconvinced. In particular, he disagreed with
the majority's standard of review. In his view, a state law implementing
the state's special interest in preserving its wildlife should be reviewed
only to determine whether the law "directly conflicts with a federal statute
or treaty, . . . allocates access in a manner that violates the Fourteenth
Amendment, . . . or represents a naked attempt to discriminate against
out-of-state enterprises in favor of in-state businesses unrelated to any
purpose of conservation."20 Applying this standard of review, Justice
Rehnquist found no infirmity in the Oklahoma statute. The possibility
that such undemanding scrutiny of state laws will undercut the "economic
unitarianism" the majority wished to foster simply did not matter to
Rehnquist.
The different standards of review adopted by the Hughes majority and
by Justice Rehnquist resulted in another Rehnquist dissent in Kassel v.
Consolidated Freightways Corp.206 In Kassel, a six-Justice majority struck
down an Iowa law barring the use on its highways of trucks longer than
sixty feet. Four Justices concluded that Iowa had not demonstrated a suf-
ficient connection between the law and highway safety to justify the in-
fringement on free interstate commerce. Two Justices concurred in the
judgment but would have held that the legislative history of the law
showed its purpose to be reducing the amount of interstate traffic through
Iowa, an objective always impermissible under the commerce clause. Jus-
tice Rehnquist wrote for the three dissenters. He maintained that the deci-
sion once again had overstepped the Court's limited authority to review
state laws under the "negative side" of the commerce clause, and that it
"seriously intrudes upon the fundamental right of the States to pass laws
to secure the safety of their citizens. '207
203. Id. at 325.
204. Id. at 337.
205. Id. at 342 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
206. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
207. Id. at 1324 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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The relationship between Rehnquist's theory of a limited commerce
clause and his theory of federalism emerged clearly in Reeves, Inc. v.
Stake,"°8 a case in which Justice Rehnquist joined the majority opinion
written by Justice Blackmun. Reeves arose from the 1978 decision of the
South Dakota Cement Commission to restrict the sale of cement from its
half-century old cement plant to South Dakota residents. The petitioner,
an out-of-state purchaser, was forced as a result to cut its activities se-
verely. A federal district court declared the restriction unconstitutional,
but was reversed by the court of appeals. The Supreme Court affirmed,
applying the state-as-market-participant/state-as-market-regulator dis-
tinction first mentioned in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.'9 The
Court stated that the commerce clause is directed only to the state as regu-
lator. The majority also rested its decision on the state sovereignty doc-
trine: "States may fairly claim some measure of a sovereign interest in
retaining freedom to decide how, with whom, and for whose benefit to
deal." 21 0
B. The Fourteenth Amendment
Perhaps Justice Rehnquist's greatest challenge in his fight to revitalize
federalism has been his effort to limit the Fourteenth Amendment in order
to minimize the states' vulnerability to federal power. The Amendment on
its face purports to limit the powers of the states and to expand the power
of the federal government. Whatever structure of federalism the Constitu-
tion of 1787 created was undeniably modified to some extent by the
Amendment, a fact that Rehnquist of course concedes. But while he ad-
mits that the Fourteenth Amendment and its companions, the Thirteenth
and Fifteenth, were intended to "sharply [alter] the balance of power be-
tween the Federal and State Governments," Justice Rehnquist insists that
the amendments
were not designed to accomplish this purpose in some vague, ill-de-
fined way which was ultimately to be discovered by this Court more
than a century after their enactment. Their language contained the
mechanisms by which their purpose was to be accomplished. Con-
gress might affirmatively legislate under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to carry out the purposes of that Amendment; and the
courts could strike down state laws found directly to violate the dic-
tates of any of the [Civil War] Amendments.
This was strong medicine, and intended to be such. But it cannot be
208. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
209. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
210. 447 U.S. at 438 n.10.
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read apart from the original understanding at Philadelphia .... 2,
In order to preserve that "original understanding," Rehnquist has em-
ployed a number of judicial devices that minimize the impact of the Civil
War Amendments.
1. Section Five
One such device is a limiting construction of the enforcement power
granted Congress under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
under the equivalent provisions of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments. These sections, according to Justice Rehnquist, grant Congress
"only the power to 'enforce' by 'appropriate' legislation the limitations on
state action embodied in those Amendments. '21 2 Thus, in City of Rome v.
United States,2" Justice Rehnquist dissented from a decision holding that
the petitioner, a political subdivision of a state wholly covered by the
preclearance provisions of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, could not "bail-
out" of coverage on its own.2 ' Rehnquist vigorously attacked the Court's
decision as an abdication to Congress of the power to construe the mean-
ing of "enforce" and "appropriate" in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. While conceding that the Amendments grant Congress
power to prohibit some conduct not in itself violative of the Amendments,
Rehnquist argued that this power is exercised "appropriately" to "en-
force" the Amendments only "if that prohibition is necessary to remedy
prior constitutional violations by the governmental unit, or if necessary to
effectively prevent purposeful discrimination .... ., Congress must
identify the wrong of constitutional dimensions that it is remedying so that
"the appropriateness of the remedy [can] be measured. 21 '6 Legislation that
is not addressed to a constitutional wrong, that is not an appropriate rem-
edy, or that penalizes a party not itself guilty of constitutional wrongdoing
(the situation in City of Rome, according to Justice Rehnquist), is beyond
the competence of Congress.
Rehnquist used a second method of limiting the impact of the Four-
teenth Amendment in writing for the Court in Pennhurst State School &
211. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 778 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
212. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 207 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (empha-
sis added).
213. Id.
214. The Act imposes certain restrictions on covered states and their political subdivisions from
these restrictions, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1976). The Voting Rights Act Amendents of 1982 permit
subdivisions of covered states to bail-out of coverage on their own. Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2, 96 Stat.
131.
215. 446 U.S. at 213.
216. Id.
1352
Vol. 91: 1317, 1982
Compleat Jeffersonian
Hospital v. Halderman.2 7 The respondents in Halderman claimed that by
accepting federal funds the state institution involved had obliged itself to
implement congressional guidelines specified in the 1975 Bill of Rights of
Institutionalized Persons.2 "8 Rehnquist conceded that Congress might be
able to impose such a condition on the states when exercising its powers
under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, but insisted that the
Court would not infer that Congress had intended to use those powers
absent an explicit congressional declaration to that effect."1 9 This surpris-
ing departure from the usual presumption that Congress intends to exer-
cise all its powers when legislating makes perfect sense in terms of Justice
Rehnquist's solicitude for state autonomy.
2. Equal Protection
Justice Rehnquist's most fundamental method of minimizing the Four-
teenth Amendment lies in his familiar resort to the "intention of the
Framers," who for this purpose are presumably the federal legislators
who drafted the Amendment and sent it to the states for ratification.
Rehnquist has steadfastly opposed the Court's use of the Amendment's
equal protection clause in areas other than race on the ground that such
use is beyond "the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. "22' For example, in Sugarman v. Dougall, Rehnquist dissented
from the Court's decision invalidating on equal protection grounds a New
York law restricting state civil service positions to United States citizens.2 "
The precedential basis for Sugarman was the Court's decision in Graham
v. Richardson that alienage was to be considered a suspect classification
for equal protection purposes because aliens constitute a "discrete and in-
sular minority" unable to defend themselves adequately through the polit-
ical process.2 2 Rehnquist's opinion attacked both the Sugarman decision
and its Graham underpinnings:
The principal purpose of those who drafted and adopted the Amend-
ment was to prohibit the States from invidiously discriminating by
reason of race . . . . But there is no language used in the Amend-
ment, or any historical evidence as to the intent of the Framers,
which would suggest to the slightest degree that it was intended to
render alienage a "suspect" classification, that it was designed in any
way to protect "discrete and insular minorities" other than racial
217. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
218. 42 U.S.C. § 6000 (Supp. IV 1980).
219. 451 U.S. at 15-18.
220. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 326 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
221. 413 U.S. 634, 649 (1973).
222. 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
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minorities, or that it would in any way justify the result reached by
the Court in [Sugarman].221
Justice Rehnquist is equally hostile, on the same historical grounds, to
equal protection strict scrutiny when it is extended beyond race to protect
"fundamental rights." In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,224 the
Supreme Court overturned on equal protection grounds a Louisiana stat-
ute that denied unacknowledged illegitimate children recovery rights
under a workmen's compensation statute upon their father's death. In
lone dissent, Rehnquist criticized the Court's use of strict scrutiny:
The difficulty with this approach, devoid as it is of any historical
or textual support in the language of the Equal Protection Clause, is
that it leaves apparently to the Justices of this Court the determina-
tion of what are, and what are not, "fundamental personal rights."
...While the Court's opinion today is by no means a sharp depar-
ture from the precedents on which it relies, it is an extraordinary
departure from what I conceive to be the intent of the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment.2
3. Due Process
In similar fashion, Justice Rehnquist advocates the acceptance of limits
derived from history on the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause.
Opposing the Court's recognition in Roe v. Wade226 of a constitutional
right to privacy in conflict with many state abortion laws, Rehnquist
wrote: "To reach its result, the Court necessarily has had to find within
the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment a right that was apparently com-
pletely unknown to the drafters of the Amendment." '227 Enforcing such a
right cannot, in Justice Rehnquist's view, be reconciled with fidelity to the
drafters' "intent."
Adherence to the intention of the Fourteenth Amendment's framers also
provides the basis for Justice Rehnquist's systematic rejection of the doc-
trine of the selective incorporation of Bill of Rights guarantees into the
Amendment's due process clause.228 Justice Rehnquist's disdain for the
223. 413 U.S. at 649-50 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
224. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
225. Id. at 179-81 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
226. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
227. Id. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
228. Justice Black insisted that the Fourteenth Amendments framers intended deprivation of lib-
erty "without due process of law" to mean "without complying with the Bill of Rights." Black, The
Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. REv. 3, 34 (1970). His historical claims were
hotly disputed, see Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The
Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949), and his view never commanded the support of a
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incorporation doctrine as an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
is open. He customarily refers to "incorporation" and "incorporated" in
quotation marks,29 and has referred to "the mysterious process of trans-
mogrification by which [a guarantee of the Bill of Rights] was held to be
'incorporated' and made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment. ' 230 He has characterized incorporation as "another judicial
building block" used by the Court to construct constitutional doctrine with
an "increasingly remote" and even "incomprehensible" connection to the
Constitution's text.2 ' Although he accepts the Court's use of the Bill of
Rights as a series of "points of reference" helpful in determining how to
apply the "flexible analytical 'tools' provided by the Equal Protection
Clause and the Due Process Clause, ' 23 2 he denies that the first eight
amendments are determinative of the meaning of the Fourteenth.
Justice Rehnquist's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence has been
most fully articulated in relation to the "incorporation" of the First
Amendment into the Fourteenth. In his separate opinion in Buckley v.
Valeo,2" Justice Rehnquist wrote:
I am of the opinion that not all of the strictures which the First
Amendment imposes upon Congress are carried over against the
States by the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather that it is only the
'general principle' of free speech, that the latter incorporates.
Given this view, cases which deal with state restrictions on First
Amendment freedoms are not fungible with those which deal with
restrictions imposed by the Federal Government ....
majority on the Court, which instead has over the years selectively incorporated provisions of the Bill
of Rights regarded as fundamental "to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty." Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968).
229. E.g., Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 309 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Hutto v.
Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 717 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 n.5
(1976).
230. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 309 (1981).
231. Snead v. Stringer, 102 S. Ct. 535, 536 n.1 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of
cert.).
232. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 441 n.6 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
233. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
234. Id. at 291 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
Rehnquist's opinion credited Justice Jackson's dissent in Beauharnais v. Illinois and Justice Harlan's
dissent in Roth v. United States with devising the basis for his position. Justice Jackson's Beauharnais
opinion stated in part that
[a]s a limitation upon power to punish written or spoken words, Fourteenth Amendment "lib-
erty" in its context of state powers and functions has meant and should mean something quite
different from "freedom" in its context of federal powers and functions. . . . Any superficial
inconsistency between applying the same standard [dear and present dangers test] but permit-
ting a wider range of action to the States is resolved upon reference to the latter part of the
statement of the formula: dear and present danger of those substantive evils which the legisla-
ture has a right to prevent. The evils at which Congress may aim, and in doing so come into
conflict with free speech, will be relatively little since it is a government of limited powers.
Because the States may reach more evils, they will have wider range to punish speech which
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One of Justice Rehnquist's most significant opinions in this area is his
dissent in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.235 The case involved a
Massachusetts statute prohibiting business corporations organized or op-
erating in the state from spending corporate funds for the purpose of in-
fluencing the vote in any state referendum not specifically and materially
affecting their assets or business. With an eye toward an upcoming refer-
endum on a constitutional amendment to impose an individual income tax
opposed by the managements of many large businesses and banks, the
state legislature included in the law a provision specifying that no referen-
dum issue concerning taxes on individuals would be deemed to fall within
the "materially affecting" exception to the general ban on expenditures.
The state argued that it had a legitimate interest in preventing corporate
money from dominating the public discussion of the proposed amendment
and in protecting the rights of stockholders who disagreed with their man-
agement's stand on the issue.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld the statute, 36 but
the United States Supreme Court reversed. The five-Justice majority rea-
soned that speech protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments does
not lose its protected character simply because it is spoken by a corpora-
tion. Justice Powell's opinion for the Court noted the absence of specific
legislative findings that the democratic process was endangered by corpo-
rate expenditures. It also held that, as a protection for dissenting stock-
holders, the statute was both underinclusive (corporate activity with re-
spect to proposed legislation was still permitted) and overinclusive (a
corporation was prohibited from spending money for a cause sanctioned
by a vote of all its stockholders).237 Justices White, Brennan, and Mar-
shall dissented substantially for the reasons given by the state in defense of
the statute.
Justice Rehnquist's separate dissent took a different tack. While ex-
pressing the view that the Massachusetts court's decision was probably
compatible with the view of the First Amendment held by the other Jus-
presents clear and present danger of bringing about those evils.
343 U.S. 250, 288, 299 (1952). Justice Harlan wrote in his Roth opinion that:
our function in reviewing state judgments under the Fourteenth Amendment is a narrow one.
. . . We can inquire only whether the state action so subverts the fundamental liberties im-
plicit in the Due Process Clause that it cannot be sustained as a rational exercise of power
.... The States' power to make printed words criminal is, of course, confined by the Four-
teenth Amendment, but only insofar as such power is inconsistent with our concepts of 'or-
dered liberty.'. . . I do not think it follows that state and federal powers in this area are the
same, and that just because the State may suppress a particular utterance, it is automatically
permissible for the Federal Government to do the same.
354 U.S. 476, 501, 503 (1957).
235. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
236. 371 Mass. 773, 359 N.E.2d 1262 (1976).
237. 435 U.S. at 793-94.
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tices, Rehnquist also stated:
I am certain that under my views of the limited application of the
First Amendment to the States, which I share with the two immedi-
ately preceding occupants of my seat on the Court [Justices Jackson
and Harlan], but not with my present colleagues, the judgment of
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts should be affirmed.238
As indicated by his earlier opinions this meant that Justice Rehnquist
would examine the Massachusetts statute only for its "rational relation to
a valid state objective" '239 and for its congruence with "the 'general princi-
ple' of free speech."'240
The dissent proceeds according to these announced principles. The eco-
nomic purposes for which the state creates a business corporation or ad-
mits it into its jurisdiction are limited. They do not require vesting the
corporation with "all the [liberties] enjoyed by natural persons," but only
with those necessary to the protection of the corporation's business or
property.2 1 It is perfectly rational, Rehnquist continues, for the state leg-
islature to conclude that the economic benefits conferred on corporations
"pose special dangers in the political sphere" and that the rights of politi-
cal expression in general "are not at all necessary to effectuate the pur-
poses for which States permit corporations to exist."4 2 Thus, the statute,
which was construed by the Massachusetts high court to permit corporate
political expression when a referendum genuinely affects corporate busi-
ness or property, possessed the necessary "rational relation" to the valid
state objectives of regulating the commercial organizations on which it had
conferred special benefits and of protecting the political process.
Furthermore, argues Rehnquist, the statute is in accord with the "gen-
eral principle" of free speech. In his view,
[t]he free flow of information is in no way diminished by the Com-
monwealth's decision to permit the operation of business corpora-
tions with limited rights of political expression. All natural persons,
who owe their existence to a higher sovereign than the Common-
wealth, remain as free as before to engage in political activity.2 3
Therefore, "[tihe statute as construed provides at least as much protection
238. Id. at 823 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
239. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
240. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 291 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
241. 435 U.S. at 825 n.4 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 826.
243. Id. at 828.
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as the Fourteenth Amendment requires. 2 44
Rejection of selective incorporation as a substantive interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment has a limiting effect on the section five enforce-
ment powers of Congress. Because liberties guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights are only indirectly related to the Fourteenth Amendment, Con-
gress's power to protect them by legislation is more limited than its power
to enforce guarantees, such as the equal protection clause (limited presum-
ably to race), which are contained in haec verba in the Amendment. 45
At least verbally, Justice Rehnquist's interpretation of Fourteenth
Amendment "liberty" is the same as that of the second Justice Harlan.
Rehnquist has written that "the 'liberty' against deprivation of which
without due process the Fourteenth Amendment protects, embraces more
than the rights found in the Bill of Rights," 6 a statement that echoes
Harlan's views. 4 '7 For Justice Rehnquist, state law, not federal law, is
determinative of the content of "the finite class of liberty interests pro-
tected" by the Amendment. 4' Rehnquist's view leaves open the possibility
that a state can reduce the sphere of liberties it may not infringe under the
due process clause simply by refusing (or failing, as in Paul v. Davis) to
define particular interests as rights. Justice Harlan, on the other hand,
believed that the federal courts could recognize individual rights "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty" although not "assured by the letter or
penumbra of the Bill of Rights," 49 and could protect them against inter-
ference regardless of whether a state recognized them as rights.
The two Justices' approaches to the Fourteenth Amendment also differ
as to the proper standard of review in due process cases. Harlan thought
that the Amendment guarantees individuals "freedom from all substantial
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints" by state governments.250
Harlan, therefore, accepted the need for a "particularly careful scrutiny of
the state needs asserted to justify [such restraints]." '' Justice Rehnquist's
contrasting view embodies his federalism principle: state legislation affect-
244. Id. Justice Rehnquist's view of the relationship of the Bill of Rights to the Fourteenth
Amendment is not limited to the First Amendment area. See for example his concurrence in Justice
Powell's dissent in Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 40 (1978). The Crist majority held that the Fifth
Amendment rule attaching jeopardy in a jury trial when the jury is empanelled and sworn in applies
to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. The dissenters argued that even if the rule is part of
the Fifth Amendment it should not be imposed on the states since it is not "fundamental to the
guarantees of the Double Jeopardy Clause." Id. at 52 (Powell, J., dissenting).
245. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 717 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Con-
gress had less authority to enforce Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment
against the states than to enforce equal protection clause).
246. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 172-73 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
247. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
248. Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1405 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
249. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499-500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
250. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
251. Id.
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ing Fourteenth Amendment liberties (themselves defined by the state) can
be reviewed by a federal court only for its "rational relation to a valid
state objective,"2 2 and possibly for its congruence with certain values so
central to a republican polity that no state could constitutionally render
them unprotected by failing to recognize them as protected interests.2"
V. Evaluating Justice Rehnquist's Federalism
Justice Rehnquist was appointed by a president who sought to identify
himself with "strict constructionism," and many of the Justice's present
admirers are devout believers in judicial restraint and in a close adherence
to the letter of the Constitution. Rehnquist himself has severely criticized
innovative constructions of the Constitution25 4 and has indicted the Court
for its use of its own precedents and of the selective incorporation doctrine
as "Constitutional building blocks. . . piled on top of one another so that
the connection between the original provision in the Constitution and the
application in a particular case is all but incomprehensible. 255 One might
assume, therefore, that Rehnquist's own judicial work would be marked
by deference to the other branches of government, and by a literalistic
exegesis of the Constitution's text.
Rhetoric notwithstanding, however, Justice Rehnquist is clearly and
consciously, not a strict constructionist and not a practitioner of judicial
restraint. He has consistently based his central doctrine of federalism on
"fundamental principles" that are "reflected" in the Tenth Amendment,s6
"embodied" in the Eleventh Amendment, 57 and "illustrated" by Younger
v. Harris.28 This method of constitutional analysis has the great advan-
tage of avoiding the limitations that might result from too close attention
to the language or history of specific constitutional provisions or to the
factual setting of a judicial precedent. It provides his federalism principle
with an almost unlimited capacity for expansion, as the remarkable
growth of the Younger doctrine illustrates. But this willingness to discover
constitutional truth in the interstices of that document is poles apart from
strict constructionism. Moreover, to implement "his federalism" Justice
252. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.113, 173 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
253. One such value is the "'general principle' of free speech." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 291
(1976) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). See also Brown v. Hartlage, 102 S. Ct. 1523, 1533
(1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in result) (provision of state corrupt practices act "impermissibly
limits freedom of speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments").
254. Rehnquist, supra note 13.
255. Snead v. Stringer, 102 S. Ct. 535, 536 & n.1. (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial
of cert.).
256. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 556 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
257. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
258. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 102 S. Ct. 177, 184 (1981).
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Rehnquist has been obliged to adopt an extremely aggressive and activist
role. Usery, after all, was an extraordinary instance of judicial activism,
involving as it did the invalidation of an exercise of Congress's "plenary"
commerce power on the basis of a doctrine nowhere to be found in the
words of the Constitution.
These characteristics of Justice Rehnquist's judicial work-his activism,
his refusal to be bound by text or precedent,25 and his invocation of
"'principles" only loosely connected to specific constitutional provi-
sions-appear at first glance to be precisely the sort of constitutional emo-
tivism that he denounced in his Article on "The Notion of a Living Con-
stitution. 260 Is he, then, simply inconsistent, caught in the same "web of
subjectivity '261 that he claims controls and mars contemporary constitu-
tional discourse? The answer Justice Rehnquist would surely give is that
his judicial record reflects not the imposition of his own values but rather
his fidelity to the intention of the Constitution's Framers. The central mo-
tifs of his constitutional decisions, the sovereign state and the limited fed-
eral government, were also, Rehnquist claims, the guiding principles of
"those who drafted and ratified the Constitution."26 2 They are admittedly
quite unlike the details of the constitutional scheme, such as the provisions
that each state should have two senators 263 and that the executive power
should be vested in one president. 264 Such specific, technical provisions
were necessarily committed to the text. The twin principles of federalism,
on the other hand, pervade the Constitution in its entirety. They are its
"tacit postulates," argues Rehnquist, the goals that the text's details were
intended to implement. As a constitutional theorist of an earlier era put it:
"[C]an any historical fact be more demonstrable than that the States did,
both in the Confederation and in the Union, retain their sovereignty and
independence as distinct communities? . . . The Constitution . . in fact
. . . is full of statehood.2 65 Since for Rehnquist this version of the Fram-
ers' intent is historically demonstrable, it can serve as a refuge from the
subjectivity of emotivism.
But if Justice Rehnquist's claim to have discovered the key to objective
constitutional analysis is to succeed, it must withstand scrutiny of both its
analytical coherence and its historical accuracy. Three questions must be
259. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 433-34 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticiz-
ing majority for "literalism" in its construction of Constitution); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 406 U.S. 164, 177 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (precedent not as binding in constitutional
law as in other areas).
260. 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976).
261. See A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 47 (1970).
262. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 557 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
263. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, ci. 1.
264. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
265. J. DAVIS, supra note 185, at 2, 130.
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asked. First, is Rehnquist's theory of federalism internally consistent? Sec-
ond, does the Justice apply it consistently as a principled basis for decision
rather than as window-dressing? Finally, does it genuinely rest on a de-
monstrable historical basis that can serve as an objective constitutional
norm?
A. The Theorys Internal Consistency
The answer to the first question is yes: Justice Rehnquist's federalism
does form a consistent constitutional theory. The core of the theory is the
idea of state sovereignty, understood in traditional fashion as autonomous
state power."' The Usery decision explicitly states this idea, noting that
there are areas of legislative competence within which the states have final
authority. Rehnquist's insistence that the states' political subdivisions be
given a similar degree of autonomy is rooted in the fact that it is through
these subdivisions that the states actually exercise many of their powers.
Furthermore, if the states are truly to be autonomous sovereigns within
the sphere of their reserved powers, the principle of federalism must
shield their activities not only from federal legislation, but also from fed-
eral judicial267 and executive interference.268
State executive agencies and courts, however, are only instrumentalities,
not ends in themselves. They implement the goals and public policies cho-
sen by the states' lawmaking authorities. Talk of state sovereignty would
be somewhat chimerical if these instrumentalities were immune from fed-
eral tampering but the central government could still choose for the states
what goals they could pursue. To give substance to state autonomy, state
substantive law must also be shielded from federal intrusion as much as
possible. This entails not only construing federal laws in ways that avoid
supplanting state laws on related subjects, but also a peculiar view of the
federal Constitution itself. The Constitution mentions concepts such as
"liberty" and "property," which it protects against state deprivation with-
out "due process." If substantive federal definitions of these concepts may
be derived from the Constitution itself, then the states will not in fact
possess legislative autonomy: the United States Constitution (as inter-
preted by the Court), and not a state legislature or supreme court will be
the ultimate arbiter in disputes over what "liberty" interests in reputation
266. For this understanding of sovereignty, see, for example, ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1278 b; T.
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (pt. II) chs. 27-28 (1651); J.S. MILL, REPRESENTIVE GOVERNMENT ch. 5
(1861).
267. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
268. United Credit Bureau v. NLRB, 102 S. Ct. 539 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from
denial of cert.).
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a state will protect."6 9 Therefore, a thoroughgoing state sovereignty doc-
trine requires that the Constitution limit the states, for the most part, only
in formal and certain procedural ways.
The principle of a federal government limited to enumerated and re-
stricted powers is also essential to state sovereignty. The latter will wither
on the vine if the federal government's sphere of competence is effectively
unbounded, as by an expansive construction of the necessary and proper
clause, or if the federal government's enumerated powers are themselves
capable of congressional expansion unrestricted by judicially enforceable
limits, as was true of the pre-Usery commerce clause. Energized by the
supremacy clause, federal rules created by Congress and Court inevitably
tend to supplant state law. The constitutionalizing of the law of defama-
tion by the Supreme Court,27 and the displacement of much corporation
law by the federal securities statutes,271 are only two examples of how this
process can take place within legal areas that are clearly a part of the
state sphere. If sovereignty is to mean real autonomy, the states must be
free from federal encroachment in their internal workings as well as in
their external activities. This can only be accomplished by setting effective
boundaries on the powers delegated to the central government. For exam-
ple, in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, the state could
not reasonably claim that the federal government could under no circum-
stances interfere, since the state, by accepting and using federal money,
had in effect entered into a "contract" with the federal government. 72
State sovereignty per se could hardly justify permitting the state to accept
federal funds without agreeing to federal conditions. Justice Rehnquist's
opinion for the Court, however, suggested another method of preserving
some autonomy for the state in such a situation, a limit internal to the
spending clause.273
B. The Theory's Consistent Application
One of the most important tests of an intellectual theory, and of a pro-
fessed adherent's true devotion to it, is the theory's power to lead the ad-
herent to decisions contrary to his or her natural inclinations. Accepting
for the purposes of discussion the standard liberal view of Justice Rehn-
quist as a right-wing ideologue, unsympathetic to claims based on individ-
269. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
270. See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 819-33 (4th ed. 1971).
271. The Supreme Court appeared to halt this trend when it refused to find that the 1934 Secur-
ity and Exchange Act's anti-fraud provisions impose fiduciary obligations on corporate managers. See
Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
272. 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
273. Id. at 17 n.13.
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ual liberties, and conceding that most of Rehnquist's federalism positions
dovetail nicely with conservative politics, it still must be said that at times
"his federalism" leads Justice Rehnquist to reach "liberal" results.
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins"' permitted the California Su-
preme Court to expand the concept of a public forum for free speech pur-
poses in that state. Moore v. Sims 7 may have resulted in greater protec-
tion for Texas children who are abused by their parents. If the Court had
adopted Rehnquist's position in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,276 that case
would have increased the environmental safety of Washington's sounds
and coasts. Hughes v. Oklahoma2 7 invalidated an attempt by Oklahoma
to conserve its wildlife, but only over Rehnquist's protests, just as Kassel
v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.28 prevented Iowa from protecting its
motorists from the danger and annoyance posed by double-trailer trucks
despite Rehnquist's arguments. If the Court had followed Justice Rehn-
quist's analysis in First National Bank v. Bellotti,2" Massachusetts would
have been allowed to take a very reasonable step to ensure that big busi-
ness and its money would not drown out other voices in a political contro-
versy. Such decisions suggest that, at least sometimes, the Justice is will-
ing to follow his federalism principles wherever they may lead.
C. The Historical Basis of Rehnquist's Federalism
The final and crucial question for Justice Rehnquist's federalism is
whether it may be derived from objective historical facts. Rehnquist's con-
stant claim, implicit or explicit, is that history "too well known to warrant
more than brief mention,"28 demonstrates the congruence of his theory
with the intent of the Framers and excludes alternative interpretations.
But if the historical evidence is less than convincing, then Rehnquist's
federalism must fail as an objective first principle.
On initial consideration, Rehnquist's historical claim seems familiar
and supportable. State sovereignty and limited federal government are au-
thentic expressions of a central strand of American constitutional philoso-
phy that found its classic expression in the thought of Thomas Jefferson.
274. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
275. 412 U.S. 415 (1979). Moore v. Sims involved a challenge to a Texas statute permitting the
State Department of Human Resources to assume through an ex parte proceeding temporary custody
of children who, it was feared, were being abused. A federal district court preliminarily enjoined the
defendant state officials from utilizing the statute. The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Rehnquist's
opinion for the Court stated that the district court should have abstained from interfering in ongoing
state proceedings in which important state interests were involved. Id. at 423.
276. 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
277. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
278. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
279. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
280. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1363
The Yale Law Journal
Jefferson has been called an "advocate of minimal government," and his
political philosophy an effort "to splinter power in order to render it less
dangerous."'  He was completely opposed to the development of an
omnicompetent national government, enforcing a unitary set of laws
throughout the Union."' In a letter to Justice William Johnson criticizing
Chief Justice John Marshall's opinions for the Court in Marbury v.
Madison28'3 and Cohens v. Virginia, s4 Jefferson came very close to Justice
Rehnquist's theory that federalism was the overriding intent of the Fram-
ers. Jefferson wrote that "[t]he capital and leading object of the constitu-
tion was to leave with the States all authorities which respected their own
citizens only and to transfer to the United States those which respected
citizens of foreign or other States, to make us several as to ourselves but
one as to all others.1
285
In the Jeffersonian tradition, the transcendent goal of freedom is unat-
tainable unless government-and especially national government-is kept
as small and unobtrusive as possible. This vision of limited government
has haunted our history from its beginning and is reflected, frequently in
haec verba, in the opinions of Justice Rehnquist. Popular imagination so
identifies Jefferson, the author of the Declaration of Independence, with
the ideal of liberty that even the patron saint of strong national govern-
ment, Abraham Lincoln, found it necessary to invoke Jefferson and his
ideals, stating that "[t]he principles of Jefferson are the definitions and
axioms of free society. 286 It is this almost canonical tradition in American
cultural and intellectual history that Rehnquist's constitutional theory
281. 4 D. MALONE, JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME: JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT 25, 26 (1970).
282.
And I do verily believe, that if the principle were to prevail, of a common law being in force in
the United States. . . it would become the most corrupt government on the earth. . .. The
true theory of our Constitution is surely the wisest and best that the States are independent as
to everything within themselves, and united as to everything respecting foreign nations. Let the
General Government be reduced to foreign concerns only ....
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gideon Granger, reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON ON DEMOCRACY
30 (S. Padover ed. 1939).
283. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
284. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (Eleventh Amendment does not bar United States Supreme
Court review of judgment secured by state against a defendant in its own courts).
285. See Letter, supra note 24, at 147. In 1821, Jefferson wrote that "it is a fatal heresy to
suppose that either our State governments are superior to the federal, or the federal to the States...
• These [the people] have made coordinate, checking and balancing each other ... each equally
supreme as to the powers delegated to itself." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to anonymous correspon-
dent (1821), reprinted in S. PADOVER, supra note 282, at 53. Jefferson abhorred the expansive inter-
pretations of the Constitution adopted by the Marshall Court whereby "the federal branch of our
government is advancing towards the usurpation of all the rights reserved to the States, and the con-
solidation in itself of all powers, foreign and domestic, and that, too, by construction which, if legiti-
mate, leave no limits to their power." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William B. Giles (Dec. 26,
1825), reprinted in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 24, at 169.
286. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Committee of Boston Republicans (April 16, 1859), re-
printed in THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 123-24 (R. Current ed. 1967).
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taps, and that gives his federalism a certain veneer of inescapability.
The problem with Justice Rehnquist's federalism, however, is that of
its parent, Jeffersonian republicanism. The tradition rests on unques-
tioned but questionable assumptions. Rehnquist (and Jefferson) assume
that freedom means political autonomy. They conclude from this that the
chief threat to freedom comes from a powerful central government. They
assume that the state governments, being closer to the people, will be both
competent and willing to guarantee the political and civil rights of their
citizens. They further assume that whatever positive governmental action
is necessary to "close the circle of our felicities 2 7 can be undertaken ef-
fectively by the states.2" Therefore, the Constitution is to be construed to
limit severely the federal government's sphere of authority and thus re-
serve for the state governments, "the true barriers of our liberty in this
country, 28 9 autonomous control over most domestic concerns. In order to
fit the Civil War Ariendments into this minimal federal scheme, Rehn-
quist views them as a mere perfection of the Jeffersonian axiom that all
287. Inaugural Address by President Jefferson (March 4, 1801), reprinted in D. MALONE, supra
note 281, at 22.
288. That Jefferson should adopt these assumptions is understandable. His experience, both per-
sonal and cultural, was that powerful central governments were in practice the chief dangers to lib-
erty. The Glorious Revolution of 1688, the American Revolution, the republican struggle against
Federalist persecution under the Alien and Sedition Acts, and the revolution by suffrage of 1800 all
exemplified for Jefferson the political fact that strong governments tend toward despotism and must be
reformed or overturned to preserve the rights of the people. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), reprinted in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
supra note 24, at 67-68.
Later American history suggests that the state governments are not in fact the "barriers of liberty"
Jefferson thought them to be. It was the states, for example' that played the active role in denying
black citizens the rights Jefferson thought they were entitled to, see G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA
218-28, 306 (1978), and that were officially accorded them by the Civil War Amendments. Justice
Rehnquist's adoption of Jefferson's presuppositions despite this later history points to a substantial
difference between the two, despite rhetorical similarities. For Jefferson, the defense of state autonomy
and opposition to federal power is always linked to the substantive goals of Jeffersonian republican-
ism. The most striking instance of Jefferson's federalism, his anonymous authorship of the Kentucky
Resolutions of 1798, was a direct response to the passage by the Federalist Congress of the Alien and
Sedition Acts, and their use by the Federalist administration of John Adams to harass republican
editors and activists. Other significant statements by Jefferson on state autonomy were similarly
linked to specific instances of the misuse of federal power. In office, Jefferson the Presidential states-
man moved some distance in practice from the limited government rhetoric of Jefferson the political
theorist and opposition politician. See A. SCHLESINGER, JR. THE AGE OF JACKSON 512 (1945). For
Jefferson the republican, federalism was a tool with which to oppose the Federalist oligarchs, to be
laid aside when inadequate for the proper end of government, "the cherishment of the people." Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Justice Johnson (1823), reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON ON DEMOCRACY,
supra note 282, at 45.
By contrast, although Rehnquist occasionally mentions the instrumental value of federalism to
American democracy, e.g., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835, 851
(1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), his focus is almost always on the value of federalism in itself.
What was for Jefferson a means to an end is for Rehnquist an end in itself.
289. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Destutt de Tracy (Jan. 26, 1811), reprinted in THOMAS
JEFFERSON ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 282, at 52.
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citizens should possess equal rights vis-a-vis the government."'
Justice Rehnquist's repetition of the familiar Jeffersonian rhetoric
tends to obscure the questionable nature of his claim that he is promoting
the "intention of the Framers." The language of state sovereignty and the
identification of a strong national government as the prime threat to lib-
erty, belong more to the Constitution's original critics than to its Framers
or supporters.291 The Anti-Federalists who opposed ratification of the
1787 document generally believed that a society can remain free only
when it is geographically small, and its government can therefore retain
close links with a homogeneous citizenry.2 Although most Anti-Federal-
ists conceded the need to provide the Confederation government with a
sure means of raising revenue and with expanded powers over interna-
tional and interstate commerce, they were virtually unanimous in the
"opinion that the leading feature of every amendment [of the Articles of
Confederation] ought to be the preservation of the individual states in
their uncontrolled constitutional rights." '293 They argued that it was "the
states in their political capacity or as sovereignties 94 that ratified the Ar-
ticles as "a firm league of friendship"' ' and that therefore only the states
could revise, dissolve, or replace the Articles with another compact.
Arguing against ratification in the Virginia Convention of June, 1788,
Patrick Henry attacked the proposed Constitution as an attempt to replace
the old, loosely knit confederation with "a great consolidated govern-
ment." 96 According to Henry, with the very first words of their proposal
the Federalists had betrayed their reprehensible intent to bypass the states
altogether and to fasten the new national government directly upon the
individual:
What right had [the Framers] to say, "We, the people"? . . . Who
authorized them to speak the language of "We, the people," instead
of, "We, the states"? States are the characteristics and the soul of a
confederation..
T .. his [proposed] government will operate like an ambuscade.
290. G. WILLS, supra note 288, at 225-28.
291. See H. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 15 (1981).
292. See id. at 16-23.
293. Letter from Robert Yates and John Lansing to Governor George Clinton (1787), reprinted
in 3 THE ANNALS OF AMERICA 190 (1968). Yates and Lansing, both New York Delegates to the 1787
Convention, left Philadelphia when they realized the Convention was going to devise a new
government.
294. Address by Luther Martin to Maryland legislature (Nov. 29, 1787), reprinted in 3 THE
ANNALS OF AMERICA 166-67 (1968).
295. ART. CONFED. art. III.
296. Henry, Address to Virginia ratifying Convention (June 1788), quoted in 3 The Annals of
America 281 (1968).
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It will destroy the state governments and swallow the liberties of the
people, without giving previous notice. 97
The Anti-Federalists' charge that the Constitution's Framers were mo-
tivated by hostility to the states' autonomy was not without cogency. The
disorders of the 1780's had convinced men like James Madison that the
"vices coming out of the state governments" were an even greater threat to
American society than the weakness of the Confederation's government,
and that a strong national government was the necessary remedy. 9
Madison and the other Federalists went to the Constitutional Convention
seeking " 'a due supremacy of the national authority' with 'the local au-
thorities' left to exist only in 'so far as they can be subordinately
useful.' -1299
The political necessities of compromise in the Convention and in the
ensuing ratification struggles persuaded leading Federalist spokesmen to
moderate their language and to present the Constitution as a unique com-
bination of federal and national elements, with each coordinate govern-
ment confined to, and protected within, its proper sphere.10 Nevertheless,
to most contemporaries it was clear that the struggle over the Constitution
was the final battle between the defendants of state sovereignty and the
proponents of national supremacy:
[To the Anti-Federalist] [t]here is, it seems, finally no middle way
between a federal or a consolidated government; and while he is
willing to define a federal government as substantially more than a
league, it is fundamentally a league. So, on the other side, while
Publius is willing to define the American federal system as some-
thing less than a national government, it is for him fundamentally a
national government." 1
The idea of state sovereignty, which as we have seen is crucial to Jus-
tice Rehnquist's theory of federalism, was the subject of heated debate
during the campaign for ratification of the Constitution. Unlike the Arti-
cles of Confederation, the Constitution contained no explicit guarantee of
state sovereignty. Although the Constitution did provide equal representa-
tion for the states in one house of the federal legislature, and obviously
297. Id. at 281-82.
298. G. WOOD, supra note 23, at 467. "By 1787 Madison, like others, had become a thorough
nationalist, intent on subordinating the states as far as possible to the sovereignty of the central gov-
ernment." Id. at 473.
299. Id. at 525 (quoting letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (April 8, 1787)).
300. Id. at 524-32.
301. H. STORING, supra note 282, at 37. "Publius" was the pseudonym used by Jay, Hamilton,
and Madison in writing The Federalist Papers.
1367
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 91: 1317, 1982
assumed that the state governments would continue to exist, its opponents
uniformly accused it of destroying state sovereignty. 02
The Federalist response to this charge took two separate tacks. One was
simply to deny that the states were or ever had been sovereign. Sover-
eignty, these Federalists asserted, had always belonged to the American
people, as a whole. 3 Other Federalists argued that the Constitution al-
lowed the states a residual sovereignty." 4 But this concession was proba-
bly more verbal than real. Federalists and Anti-Federalists agreed that the
Articles of Confederation were based on the principle of state sover-
eignty.305 Because the Federalists claimed that "the existing Confederation
is founded on principles which are fallacious,' 3 6 the Anti-Federalists con-
cluded that the argument that the proposed Constitution preserved state
sovereignty was mere propaganda. 7 The validity of that conclusion is
bolstered by the fact that both sides agreed that "two co-ordinate sover-
eignties would be a solecism in politics."30 The Anti-Federalists wished to
avoid such political bad grammar by denying sovereignty to the federal
government. The Federalists, on the other hand, were united in their be-
lief that the new Constitution would rid America of the "political mon-
ster" of autonomous state sovereignties within the Union. 9
The nationalism that emerges with some clarity from the writings of
the Constitution's supporters t0 contrasts starkly with the loose federalism
302. Address by Thomas Tredwell to the New York ratifying convention (1788), quoted in A.
MASON, THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE 70 (2d ed. 1972); Address by Patrick Henry to the Virginia
ratifying convention (1788), quoted in A. MASON, supra, at 75; R. Yates, Letters of Brutus No. 15,
quoted in A. MASON, supra, at 112-13; L. MARTIN, THE GENUINE INFORMATION DELIVERED TO THE
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND (1787), quoted in A. MASON, supra, at 114; Address by
Robert Whitehill to Pennsylvania ratifying convention (1787), quoted in A. MASON, supra, at 135.
303. Address by Archibald Maclaine to North Carolina ratifying convention (1788), quoted in A.
MASON, supra note 302, at 165-66; Address by James Wilson to Pennsylvania ratifying convention
(Dec. 6, 1787), quoted in A. MASON, supra note 302, at 72.
304. THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 152 (Bantam Books ed. 1982) (A. Hamilton); id. No. 43, at 224
U. Madison); id. No. 62, at 313-14 (Bantam Books ed. 1982) (U. Madison).
305. H. STORING, supra note 291, at 9.
306. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 177 (Bantam Books ed. 1982) U. Madison); c. id. No. 42, at
(Bantam Books ed. 1982) U. Madison) ("[The articles of confederation have inconsiderately endeav-
ored to accomplish impossibilities: to reconcile a partial sovereignty in the Union, with compleat sov-
ereignty in the states .... 1")
307. See A. MASON, supra note 302, at 75.
308. See Dissent of the Anti-Federalist Minority in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention (Dec.
18, 1787), quoted in A. MASON, supra note 302, at 143; accord THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 70
(Bantam Books ed. 1982) (A. Hamilton) ("the political monster of an imperium in imperio").
309. See G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA 164-75 (1981).
310. The Anti-Federalist attack on the Constitution was often summed up in the claim that it
would result in a "consolidated government." See, e.g., Dissent of the Anti-Federalist Minority, supra
note 302, at 142. It is significant that although the language of "consolidation" carried with it strongly
nationalist overtones, see H. STORING, supra note 291, at 10-11, the cover letter over George Wash-
ington's signature sent with the proposed Constitution to the states spoke of "consolidation" as the
object of the Convention's work: "In all our deliberations on this subject we kept steadily in our view,
that which appears to us the greatest interest of every true American, the consolidation of our Union.
." Quoted in G. WILLS, supra note 309, at 170.
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that Justice Rehnquist presents as the intention of the Framers. Rehn-
quist seems to have fallen into the curious historical error of projecting the
language and thought of the opponents of the Constitution onto its draft-
ers. This error leads him to misconstrue the instrument intended to fash-
ion a strong central government as though it were the charter of state
autonomy. The various Framers had differing goals to some extent, but
they were unified in their opposition to the perpetuation of the model of
an alliance of sovereignties that existed under the Articles of Confedera-
tion and that Rehnquist would recreate.'
Justice Rehnquist's "Framers" sound superficially like Jefferson, re-
markably like the opponents of the Constitution, and not at all like the
statesmen who created the Constitution and battled successfully for its rat-
ification in the thirteen state conventions. His federalism, far from being
"the intention of the Framers," is an inadvertent repudiation of part of
their achievement. It would restore to the states, by judicial fiat, the "sov-
ereignty, freedom and independence" that the Articles of Confederation
guaranteed explicitly '1 2 but that the Constitution replaced by an implicit
assertion of the direct, unmediated relation of the new federal government
to the American people as a unitary body politic. 1'3
Therefore, Rehnquist's attempt to use the intention of the Framers as
an objective basis for constitutional law fails at its most fundamental and
crucial point-its connection to history. The power of his argument rests
on the claim that his position is derived from objectively determinable his-
torical facts about the Framers' purposes. But his reconstruction of the
Framers' intention not only fails to convince, it in fact seems susceptible to
objective refutation.34 The evidence is strong that the Framers intended to
establish a vigorous national government for the purpose of securing the
liberties of the sovereign people. Justice Rehnquist offers us instead an
alliance of sovereign state governments dedicated to the preservation of
their parochial autonomy. By so misreading the Constitution's text and
history, Rehnquist commits the precise emotivist error that he set out to
311. Garry Wills has suggested that the success of "Publius" in disguising for tactical political
reasons the Federalists' commitment to a strongly nationalist system of government has misled later
readers of The Federalist Papers into reading it, and the Constitution it expounds, as defenses of a
loose union of sovereign states, that is as federalist in Justice Rehnquist's sense. Wills argues, in
accord with the position taken in this Article, that such a "federalist" reading misunderstands the
Federalists' actual goals. See G. WILLS, supra note 309, at 172-75.
312. ART. CONFED. art. II.
313. U.S. CONST. preamble. Hamilton identified the inability of Congress under the Articles to
act directly upon individuals as the Articles' "great and radical vice." THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 70
(Bantam Books, ed. 1982) (A. Hamilton).
314. Indeed, some recent scholarship casts doubt on the claim that the states were sovereign even
before the Constitution's ratification. See J. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS 135-
91 (1979); Morris, The Forging of the Union Reconsidered: A Historical Refutation of State Sover-
eignty over Seabeds, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1057 (1974).
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avoid: the erection of a judge's personal values and opinions into constitu-
tional norms.
1370
